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ABSTRACT
Existing studies suggest that normative commitments to the European Union’s
human rights standards remain weak in states applying for EU membership, and that
citizens are unresponsive to information the EU provides. This research does not gauge
public support for human rights when they are framed as an EU issue. In an original
experimental survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I examine the effect of EU framing on
support for the equal treatment of gay people, equal pay between women and men, and
blame assigned to the government for policy outcomes regarding these rights. I find that
EU frames affect blame towards the government, which in turn influences support for
women’s rights. EU frames produce a negative effect on support for women’s rights
among those who support their state’s independence from the EU. Moreover, the EU
establishes equal pay for equal work as a criterion for applicant states. Conventional
wisdom holds that governments meet criteria for membership in order to gain benefits
from membership. In another experimental survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I examine
the effect of framing equal pay as a criterion for membership. Among those who believe
that economic benefits from EU membership are likely, framing gender equality as
necessary for EU membership elicited higher levels of support for gender equality, in
comparison to those who believe that benefits are unlikely. The EU also has recently set
up standards for membership regarding gay rights, but commitment to the standards
remains weak. This lack of commitment presents a puzzle for researchers and
policymakers: if the EU’s gay rights standards have minimal consequences, then why
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would anyone want to hand over powers concerning gay rights to the EU? I find that
those who identify more closely with gay people are more likely to vote for parties that
want to transfer control of gay rights to the EU. Since the EU currently lacks effective
gay rights standards, this study establishes an evidence-based imperative for the EU to
use its capacities to serve gay constituencies directly, such as providing shelters and
counselling for gay people and their families.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Governments aspiring to join the European Union (EU) must meet certain criteria
beforehand. These criteria not only affect the political elites, but also influence the
policies supported or opposed by citizens. For instance, in Turkey, where Turkish
nationalism remains a popular political attitude, the political criteria ask the government
to allow more expressions of Kurdish culture (CEC 2012b; IRI 2012). In Bosnia and
Herzegovina, where existing institutional arrangements provide vetoes for Bosnian,
Croat, and Serb interests; the political criteria ask the government to create an organ that
speaks in one voice on matters of EU policy (CEC 2012a; NDI 2009). The criteria for
social policy ask all applicant countries to promote women’s rights and gay rights,
including equal-pay-for-equal-work and equal treatment in the workplace. Do public
attitudes and behavior pertaining to rights change along with the candidate state’s laws?
In this dissertation, I examine whether the EU accession process influences citizen
opinions on the gender equality and gay rights, policies that are necessary for
membership.
I argue that citizens affirm their desire for EU membership by validating the EU’s
prescriptions concerning gender equality and gay rights. In particular, I examine equalpay-for-equal-work between women and men, and equal treatment in the workplace for
gay people. I expect that the European Union serves as a ‘perceptual anchor’ for opinion
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formation in applicant states. In other words, when a policy proposal for equal pay or
equal treatment emphasizes its status as a criterion for EU membership, public opinion
moves in the proposal’s favor, among those who are favorable towards membership and
among those who see economic benefits in membership. I expect that the opinions of
citizens move favorably among these groups towards gender equality proposals, which
emphasize advancement towards EU membership. The goal of EU membership would
increase commitment to gender equality not only in the laws passed by politicians but
also in the commitment to gender equality and gay rights in the attitudes of citizens. The
EU seeks to create European-wide solutions for European-wide problems like
discrimination, but this promotion of rights also may have unintended consequences.
People who oppose membership, oppose the values the EU espouses, or do not perceive
economic benefits from EU membership may not respond favorably to the EU’s
interventions.
In this dissertation, I carried out two population-based survey experiments in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, an applicant state in the EU accession process. The first survey
included hypothetical newspaper articles on gender equality, a criteria for membership,
which address equal pay as advancing EU membership (or not). These newspaper
vignettes also prime respondents to consider the importance of meeting the criteria for
membership or prime respondents to consider that eventual membership is certain (both
of these types of rhetoric are used by EU officials when promoting membership). This
treatment allows me to better distinguish between sincere opinion movement and
strategic support for gender equality because EU membership is at stake. I split the
sample of respondents into those who perceive economic benefits from EU membership
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and those who do not. I can examine the treatment effects within these groups. My aim
was to observe the influences of this experimental manipulation on 1) support for equal
pay, 2) one’s likelihood to vote for parties that support for equal pay, 3) and one’s
likelihood to pay higher taxes to achieve equal pay. The experimental design allowed me
to assess the perceptual anchor hypothesis: public opinion moves favorably towards
issues emphasizing membership, among those perceiving benefits.
The second survey included the issues of equal pay for equal work between
women and men, and equal treatment for gay people in the work place. These issues are
framed as either conditions for EU member (or not). These issues also are primed with
information saying that conditions for women and gay people (equal pay for equal work
between women and men, equal treatment in the workplace for gay people) are
particularly bad, and the survey addresses whether the government should be blamed for
these bad conditions. My aim was to observe the influence of these treatments on 1)
support for equal pay (or evaluation biases), and who is to blame for bad conditions for
these rights (or attribution biases). Hence, we can observe whether EU frames can trigger
biases for or against women’s rights and gay rights. Understanding these biases is
consequential for marginalized people in applicant states.
After conducting the first survey which focuses on gender equality, I took up the
issue of gay rights in this study in order to assess issues with different levels of popularity
and the credibility of EU standards in applicant states. Commitment to the European
Union’s gay rights standards remains weak in countries applying for EU membership.
Homophobia is acute in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the country provides a case where
people who identify with gay people may desire new governance in the form of
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institutions that are external to the state. For instances, 55 percent of respondents do not
think it is appropriate to report job promotions that discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation, 55 percent of respondents tend to not see the government as responsible for
the treatment of gay people, 66 percent of respondents said they would be less likely to
help lobby for gay rights if a gay rights activist asked them to help, and 72 percent of
respondents exhibit no feeling of closeness to gay people as a social group (1.5 percent
identify as extremely close to gay people as a group).
This project is significant for several reasons. I specify an international stimulus
on domestic society which conditionally increases and decreases favorability in the
populace towards gender equality: the EU’s criteria for membership. When gender
equality is tied to membership, support for gender equality increases or decreases based
on underlying predispositions. I anticipate not only increased favorable attitudes but also
more tangible manifestations of gender equality support such as supporting women’s
rights activists’ efforts to lobby politicians about gender equality, and turning in
discriminating employers to state authorities. I also anticipate increases in support for
gender equality even if membership seems guaranteed, which would suggest a deeper
normative commitment among people to gender equality beyond achieving EU
membership.
The project also will advance the scholarship on domestic support for
international organizations by experimentally testing the influence of the EU on opinion
formation among citizens, as opposed to establishing correlations with observational data
(Gabel 1998). By examining the role of international organizations in opinion formation,
this project elucidates the impact of transnational actors on state-society relations
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(changing opinions on the conditions contained in national agreements) (Risse 2010).
Hence, this project advances research on Europeanization by specifying and testing a
causal link between the EU and attitudes on domestic policies in Europe
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). EU-based opinion formation, if it exists, implies
a changing relationship between citizens and a supranational polity; where one’s attention
shifts away from the state government and towards a new political center (Haas 1958).
The EU may play an important role in opinion formation and can lead to objections in the
populace, which are key for public participation in democracies that can hold elites
accountable for their actions (Disch 2011).
While elaborating on reasons for people’s support for the EU and its policies,
existing literature does not examine the influence of the EU on opinion formation. The
EU public opinion literature is missing causal links between national level sentiments and
sentiments about the EU (Gaxie 2011, 11). As Gaxie (2011) contends about death penalty
attitudes in Europe, “correlations can be observed between survey responses on the death
penalty and European integration, but this does not imply that interviewees make
reference to the death penalty when asked about European integration” (11). Studies of
the individual economic context suggest that people make reference to the costs and
benefits of the EU when assessing deeper integration, but do not show whether or how
people take the EU into consideration when making decisions. Essentially, the link
between European integration attitudes and individual perceptions of other issues is not
clear.
In the following sections, I first discuss advancements in the study of public
opinion on European integration and the criteria for EU membership. I theorize that
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issues emphasizing advancement towards EU membership move opinions. After
establishing the theory and hypotheses, I explain my issue selection (gender equality and
gay rights) and case selection (Bosnia and Herzegovina). I then elaborate on my testing
strategy, which uses survey experiments with a state-wide representative samples of
citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From there, I describe the contents of the three
empirical chapters of the dissertations.
1.1 A THEORY OF OPINION FORMATION AND EU MEMBERSHIP
Governments aspire to join the European Union (EU) in order to gain closer
access to European markets, join influential EU decision-making bodies, and attain many
other benefits. These enticements influence the populace which subjectively perceive
benefits such as access to a greater variety of goods, ease of travel, EU structural funds,
and the prestige of being ‘more European’ (just to name a few). In order to join,
governments pass laws in order to comply with EU standards. The EU criteria on which I
focus are gender equality and gay rights, which require reforms among all prospective
members. These issue areas, which concerns equal treatment in the workplace, workplace
conditions, unfair hiring/firing, maternity leave, pregnancy, and pensions; has broad
implications for the quality of life and well-bring of citizens. In particular, I examine
equal-pay-for-equal-work between women and men, and equal treatment in the
workplace for gay people. This study has important implications for the question of
whether normative change among citizens concerning gender equality and gay rights
accompanies the state’s legal changes when trying to join the EU.
My argument is that citizens affirm their desire for EU membership by validating
the EU’s prescriptions for applicant state governments pertaining to women’s rights and
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gay rights. Sponsorship by institutions influences opinions by serving as a “perceptual
anchor that shades the interpretation of information” (such as hearing that one’s political
party supports a policy proposal) (Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus 2013, 60). I posit
that the EU serves as a ‘perceptual anchor’ for opinion formation in candidate states. In a
similar way to considerations of political parties, it is consequential for citizens’ opinion
formation when human rights become associated with the EU.
Public opinion and experimental research (especially from American politics)
offer suggestions about how to study the influence of the European Union on opinion
formation. Public opinion studies since Campbell et al. (1960) have highlighted the
centrality of political parties in individuals’ political identity. In domestic politics, parties
compete and present varying messages to their constituencies. Experimental studies
manipulate party cues and issue frames, and their findings suggest that party cues matter
(influencing issue support and vote choices) (Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus 2013;
Slothuus 2010). These results follow partisan motivated reasoning theory, which posits
that individuals hold stronger views and ascribe more importance to attitudes if they
confirm prior beliefs (Druckman and Nelson 2003; Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus
2013; Slothuus 2010).
Likewise, EU officials, domestic politicians (for and against the EU) have gotten
involved in spreading information about EU membership as well as the criteria for
membership (often in the form of civil society dialogues between civil society groups and
government/EU officials). If the EU accession process influences public opinion, and the
EU becomes a ‘perceptual anchor’ for one’s calculations about domestic policies, then
the theory would predict an ‘EU-based partisan reasoning’ emerging among membership
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supporters. Policy proposals that confirm their belief in EU advancement (a policy
proposal touting EU membership) would engender more support for that policy. I expect
greater support among citizens for policy proposals on equal pay, when they emphasize
their role in the advancement towards EU membership. In particular, I examine the effect
of this emphasis on those who perceive benefits from the EU, those who agree with the
principles of EU’s gender equality policies, and those who desire EU membership. The
surveys reflect the goal of testing for experimental treatment effects among these groups.
I argue that citizens react to the EU’s prescriptions for candidate governments.
However, this is not an argument that only pertains to the EU’s involvement in women’s
rights and gay rights, but also how the EU is involved. By establishing criteria (or hoops
for the state to jump through in order to gain membership), the EU also is incentivizing
citizens and perhaps being punitive as well by threatening to withhold membership.
Hence, my first experimental survey includes an experiment which examines that effect
of EU conditionality (setting up the criteria for membership). The EU may be affecting
different groups based on their sense of benefits from the EU and based on their feelings
of agreement with the values the EU espouses. For marginalized peoples and their
advocates a worry could be that the EU’s conditions for membership could perturb
people who don’t see benefits in EU membership, and/or people who do not agree with
the EU’s human rights standards. Constituencies could be turned away from human
rights by the EU’s involvement.
Strategic cost/benefit decision-making arguably plays a role in the decisionmaking of candidate state populaces when they evaluate gender equality. I expect that the
EU emphasis effect from hypothesis one is stronger when the proposal emphasizes the
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importance of meeting the criteria for EU membership. The strategic decision to express
greater support for gender equality in order to achieve membership does not suggest that
one personally perceives gender equality as a more valid policy (the ‘right’ thing to do).
Therefore, I include whether or not EU membership is certain in the future as a treatment.
I can prime certainty over membership in the minds of the respondents, which reduces
the likelihood that they will respond strategically and increase support for gender equality
just because EU membership is at stake.
This prime allows me to better understand whether the EU criteria promote
strategic thinking, or whether EU rules enhance the validity of gender equality in
people’s minds. Essentially, if respondents think that EU membership is “a lock” then
they should not respond as strategically (supporting gender equality in order to achieve
membership). Hence, I could better distinguish the increased prescriptive validity of EU
rules from one providing more support to gender equality because membership is at
stake. If respondents’ support for gender equality increases even when they are told
membership is certain, I would have evidence of a deeper influence from the EU in
people’s decision-making when considering gender. Moreover, there is some degree of
foreknowledge about the gender equality criteria that should be expected among the
population. This prime can mitigate this ‘pre-treatment’ by suggesting that the criteria
issue is less important for eventual membership in one experimental group and more
important in another experimental group (mitigating the diff between those with and
without prior knowledge). For the dependent variable, in the first study, I measure not
only support for gender equality with one measure, but instead a twenty five point
measure based on questions regarding 1) support for equal pay, 2) one’s likelihood to
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vote for parties that support for equal pay, 3) and one’s likelihood to pay higher taxes to
achieve equal pay.
For the second survey, I take a different approach to unpack the effects from the
EU’s involvement in human rights policies. I examine how the EU labelling given to
criteria issues like women’s rights and gay rights triggers biases among respondents with
regards to their preferences for EU membership. Previously, I examined the effect of the
EU on support for women’s rights (in different ways, such as voting behavior and
willingness to pay taxes), but biases not only have consequences for direct support. They
also have important implications for who individuals blame for policy outcomes, such as
the level of discrimination in society. People blame and absolve politicians and
institutions in ways that reflect their predispositions. Moreover, citizens in applicant
states like Bosnia and Herzegovina live in conditions where women and gay people face
discrimination at higher levels in comparison to other European countries. In terms of
addressing policy concerns of the EU, providing information about conditions on the
ground should collide with people’s predispositions about EU membership, where
opponents of independence do not want their government to have to bear the
responsibility of addressing policy outcomes that would align their country with the EU.
If responsibility assignment is affected by the EU level, this should lead to further effects
on opinions about women’s rights and gay rights, because if one feels that the
government should not address an issue; then one’s support for the issue is likely to
decrease as well.

10

1.2 SURVEY METHOD
I plan to use population-based survey experiments to study public attitudes in EU
candidate states (Mutz 2011). These experiments entail researchers “using survey
sampling to produce a collection of experimental subjects that is representative of the
target population of interest for a particular theory” (a country, region, or social group,
for instances) (Mutz 2011, 2). The surveys are performed with a theoretically motivated
sample (nationally representative samples of populaces in an EU applicant states)
(Morton and Williams 2010, 260). While conventional surveys and existing data (such as
the Eurobarometer and the World Values Survey) allow me to ascertain the association
between supporting EU membership and supporting the accession criteria, they would not
allow me to know if EU membership spurs individuals to ascribe more support and
importance to issues connected to EU accession (changing their attitudes to conform to
EU criteria) (Gaxie 2011, 11). Essentially, I want to know how EU candidate state
populations respond to policies framed as advancing the state’s bid for EU membership,
so I sample from a population represented by a government that is trying to join. The
respondents in a survey experiment are assigned randomly to control groups and
treatment groups that produce variation in the explanatory variables (Mutz 2011, 2).
Here, I manipulate whether or not an issue area is tied to EU membership in a public
debate, and whether or not membership seems guaranteed or tied to conditions. This
dissertation includes two surveys, and the chapters that follow elaborate upon their
research design, and these designs are further described below in the chapter descriptions.
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1.3 CASE SELECTION
I will use survey sampling “to produce a collection of experimental subjects that
is representative of the target population of interest for a particular theory” (a country,
region, or social group, for instance) (Mutz 2011, 2). I want to know how citizens in
countries aspiring to join the EU respond to policies framed as advancing the state’s bid
for EU membership, so I plan collect a representative population sample from an aspiring
state (Morton and Williams 2010, 390). I made my case selection based on available data
and characteristics of the diverse regions of the country. Bosnia and Herzegovina
provides a context where my contentions can be readily tested.
First, fourteen governments are in the country (the state, two entities, ten cantons,
and one independent district) creating multiple constituencies to examine. Second,
support for European Union accession varies considerably across the governing bodies
(the entities), pro- viding me leverage for distinguishing between constituency opinion on
EU membership and constituency opinion on the EU conditions (such as gender equality)
(NDI 2009). According to the NDI (2009) survey, 74% of respondents in the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina completely support accession to the EU, compared to 40% of
respondents in the Republika Srpska (18% somewhat supported accession in FBiH while
43% somewhat supported acces- sion the RS). The difference in public opinion creates
hypothetical expectations that can be confirmed or refuted by the survey (EU aspirations
more influential in the FBiH when compared to the RS). Due to the multi-national
governmental arrangement of BiH, my sur- vey experiment will be cross-national
between the Serb controlled RS and the Bosnian and Croat controlled FBiH. It also will
be cross-national in terms of the three nationalities living throughout these governing
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entities. Hence, I can test my hypotheses among diverse groups in diverse governmental
contexts (see also Tomz and Weeks 2013).
Because gender equality and gay rights are issues that (although a requirement for
membership) have received limited commitments from candidate governments and the
EU, I expect that citizens are less likely to draw a connection between the gender equality
and gay rights and the EU (the topic of the experimental vignettes) without prompting.
Gender equality and gay rights are distinguishable from other issue areas like ease of
travel to EU countries and the institutional balance between Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats
which are more likely to spur a connection to EU membership in the minds of
respondents. Therefore, for gender equality and gay rights, I can more credibly cue the
salience of this issue for EU membership advancement (respondents are less likely to be
‘pre-treated’ through their previous experiences) (Gaines and Kuklinski 2011, 456). The
data elaborated upon in the following chapters show that the correlation between these
rights policies and support for EU membership, is indeed low.
In the following sections, I describe the contents of the three empirical chapters of
the dissertation, including the argument and findings.
1.4 DOES THE CARROT ON THE STICK WORK?
In the first empirical chapter, I examine the effects from the EU establishing
conditions of membership on applicant countries, because the European Union has a
problem. The EU’s policy standards ask all applicant states to promote equal treatment
in the workplace, including equal-pay-for-equal-work between women and men.
However, across recent and current candidacies, implementation and commitment to
gender equality has been sporadic and inconsistent. Despite a 2003 gender equality law
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in Bosnia and Herzegovina, discrimination on the basis of gender remains an everyday
reality, including workplace harassment, limited maternity rights, and unfair hiring.
Existing research shows that the EU’s standards for membership helped to lead
governments to change their laws to match successfully, but we do not know whether the
EU’s standards affect normative commitments to women’s rights.
In 2012, around one thousand women marched in protest of gender inequality and
discrimination in Sarajevo. Are people’s attitudes toward gender equality affected when
the EU emphasizes this issue as a criterion for membership? Do opponents of gender
equality express more favorable opinions about women’s rights when the EU promotes
its criteria for membership? This question is important because the EU strives to change
states’ policies. For instance, in 2015 EU foreign ministers told Bosnia and Herzegovina
that “meaningful progress on the implementation of [the] agenda for reforms will be
necessary for a membership application to be considered by the European Union”, and
“tangible results will be fundamental for the Council to consider a membership
application in the future”. However, the EU has been criticized for years for acting
against what citizens want (part of the EU’s democratic deficit).
What the EU should hope is that attitudes change when it prescribes policies, because this
would promote values like gender equality and enhance its legitimacy. Ideally, the EU’s
involvement in domestic politics reduces objections to items on the reform agenda, such
as women’s rights standards, and does not exacerbate objections.
Existing studies suggest the messages from EU officials do not affect opinion
formation and that EU issues are secondary to national issues, but we do not know how
the public responds to the EU’s demand for reforms, dangling potential membership like
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a ‘carrot on a stick’ (Hix and Marsh, 2007; Hix and March, 2011; Schmitt, 2005; de
Vreese et al., 2006; Hobolt et al., 2013). I argue that the economic enticement of EU
membership influences the general population. The population is split into people who
already agree with the principles behind EU standards and those who do not agree. These
opponents are an impediment to normative commitment to EU standards, and a key group
of interest in this study. I expect that EU standards move public opinion among the
opponents of gender equality, when they believe in the economic benefit of membership.
Individuals subjectively perceive benefits to the domestic economy from joining the EU.
Examples include access to a greater variety of goods, ease of travel, and the EU’s
structural funds.
In the EU accession process, the EU applies conditionality on candidates, where
meeting the criteria for membership is necessary to join. Hence, the EU’s enticements
can be represented by the ‘carrot on the stick’ analogy where meeting standards leads to
the ‘carrot’ of membership. Among those who believe in the EU’s economic benefits, I
expect that the EU’s emphasis on gender equality has a larger effect when they believe
that meeting the standards leads to membership, in comparison to when they believe that
EU membership is guaranteed. Put another way, when one believes that EU membership
is guaranteed, one can gain the benefits of membership without adopting the criteria.
In this chapter I gauge public support for women’s rights. To know if the
prospect of EU membership influences opinions, I need to conduct an experiment which
randomly assigns respondents to experimental groups which receive messages
concerning a equal pay for equal work policy proposal within a public debate among civil
society groups. For the first treatment, I manipulate whether or not the equal pay
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proposal is addressed as advancing a bid for EU membership in a public debate
(Emphasis Treatment). For the second treatment, I manipulate whether or not meeting
the membership criteria is addressed as important for achieving membership, as told by a
European Union official: either guaranteeing membership (Certainty Treatment) or
saying that meeting the criteria is important. The dependent variable is support for the
equal pay proposal, and this is a composite measure with three survey items regarding 1)
support for the proposal, 2) vote choice if a party supported the proposal, and 3) one’s
willingness to pay higher taxes to implement the proposal (each are five point scales).
When membership is guaranteed, the EU’s emphasis message produces a stronger
increase in support for gender equality among those who do not support equal pay
between women and men. I find that the EU’s political messages emphasizing that EU
membership is guaranteed and gender equality as a standard for membership move
opinions in favor of gender equality standards when opponents of gender equality
perceive benefits from membership. These results suggest that the EU needs to make the
benefits of membership apparent and achievable in order to affect opinions on gender
equality.
1.5 HOW CITIZENS REACT TO THE EU’S HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
In the second empirical chapter, I examine how the EU standards for membership
are triggering biases in Bosnia. Adopting EU human rights standards is useful for
ensuring democratic values in states applying for EU membership. EU standards limit
opportunities for governments to renege on their human rights commitments due to
changes in their domestic politics (Moravcsik 2000; 2002). On the other hand, the EU’s
involvement in human rights can lead to contentious politics, as evidenced by the
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backlash against gay rights in Poland after the EU pressured the parliament to pass
workplace anti-discrimination laws in order to gain membership in 2004 (O’Dwyer 2013;
Kochenov 2007; O’Dwyer and Schwartz 2010). Warsaw banned Pride parades in 2004
and 2005, after hosting parades in 2001, 2002, and 2003. Education minister Roman
Giertych proposed legislation to prevent ‘homosexual propaganda’ from being taught in
schools in 2007. Complying with the EU’s human rights standards is an important public
debate in applicant states, especially for marginalized groups like women and gay people.
In applicant states, EU officials engage the public with civil society dialogues. These
meetings elicit feedback from citizens about proposed policy changes and outline how the
adoption of EU standards is the price of EU membership (Roth, 2008; Council of the
European Union, 2010; European Commission, 2005; 2008). The EU’s goal is “giving
everyone a voice in EU enlargement”, after the 2004 enlargement was criticized for
involving reform processes where citizens were neither informed nor prepared (European
Commission 2005; 2008; Montoya 2013, 146).
However, research on European public opinion does not examine opinions among
applicant state citizens who prefer their state’s independence from the EU, and it does not
gauge these citizens’ responses to the EU’s human rights agenda. The established
consensus is that citizens are disinterested with the EU, and do not respond to
information provided by the EU, but we do not know what happens when the EU’s rights
agenda confronts citizens’ predispositions about EU membership (Follesdal and Hix
2006; Hix and Marsh 2007; Hix and Marsh 2011; Hobolt and Tilley 2014; Weber 2011;
de Vreese et al. 2006; Hobolt and Tilley 2013). These omissions have major
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ramifications for marginalized groups, because the EU’s attempts to modify an applicant
state’s human rights may lead citizens to reject human rights.
Existing studies show that informational short-cuts are a key component of
political behavior in competitive democracies, because affiliations like one’s partisanship
affect how one perceives policies, and the institutions one blames for the condition of
those policies, when they are associated with different parties (partisan bias) (Lupia and
McCubbins 1998; Brader and Tucker 2009; Tilley and Hobolt 2011; Druckman et al.
2013). I argue that supporters of state independence and supporters of integration with
the EU comprise ‘partisan’ groups with opposing interests in the political conflict
regarding integration, sharing policy control between states. Scholars have given little
attention to the opinions of people who desire their state’s independence, despite their
growing importance given the referendum on the UK’s EU membership, the rise of antiEU parties, and referenda to join the EU in applicant states.
A key component of the EU’s rights agenda has been to remove “irrational
limitations” on free markets throughout Europe (Duina 1999). Hence, a longstanding EU
policy has been helping the female labor force by promoting equal pay between women
and men (Duina 1999). In recent years, the EU has helped gay people in the labor force
by promoting equal treatment in the workplace (preventing unfair hiring and firing
practices, for instance). Following my argument, the EU’s promotion of women’s rights
and gay rights provides a cue for citizens which helps them decide whether these policies
match their interests. I expect people who prefer their state’s independence to feel less
supportive of rights when they are told rights advance their state’s integration with the
EU (an EU framing of rights), in comparison to EU supporters.
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Among those told that rights advance integration, I expect that independence
supporters are more likely to absolve their government of blame for bad conditions
regarding rights, in comparison to EU supporters. Furthermore, a comparison between
human rights is important because different rights can pertain to groups that have
different levels of marginalization in society. Political institutions at the national and
European levels have been more deeply involved in women’s rights in comparison to the
newer, more controversial gay rights. Homophobic discrimination in society often goes
unchallenged by government action. If women’s rights are perceived as an appropriate
responsibility of political institutions in comparison to gay rights, then the EU should
more credibly signal that women’s rights advance a state’s integration with the EU, in
comparison to gay rights. These expectations suggest that the EU possesses a greater
influence on public opinion than the established consensus presumes, because citizens
would have the capacity to object to rights based on their interests regarding
independence from the EU.
Joining the EU involves shifting policy control to the supranational level, and the
political choice to remain more independent or integrate with the community of EU
states. In the EU accession process, national independence is the incumbent condition,
and European integration alters this status quo. Governments pass rights legislation in
order to meet the EU’s requirements for membership, which strive to establish a unified
system of anti-discrimination rules throughout Europe. However, normative commitment
to rights among leaders and citizens remains weak, and these issues require greater public
support in order for implementation to succeed (Falkner et al. 2005; Avdeyeva 2010).
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Bosnia and Herzegovina provides a theoretically-appropriate case, because it is
divided into two autonomous, governing regions; which are relevant for my expectations
regarding the assignment of blame for human rights problems. The two regions, the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS), possess
low and high levels of institutional clarity. The FBiH is ruled by ten cantons (each with a
parliament) as well as an overall FBiH parliament, while the RS is ruled by one unified
parliament. Citizens have a more difficult time assigning responsibility for policy
outcomes to institutions in contexts with low levels of institutional clarity. With lower
levels of institutional clarity, citizens rely more on biases when assigning responsibility
for policy outcomes (Tilley and Hobolt 2011, 13). Biases elicited by experimental
frames should be stronger in the FBiH (where clarity is murkier) in comparison to the RS.
From this case selection, we can gather data on citizens who theoretically have more or
less difficulty assigning responsibility to political institutions for policy outcomes.
I find mixed evidence in favor of the argument that the EU serves as a cue for
applicant state citizens. The EU framing of equal pay (by itself) did not move opinions
among independence or EU supporters. However, among those who are told that equal
pay advances integration, I find that independence supporters are more likely to absolve
their government of blame for rights, in comparison to EU supporters, when given
information about bad conditions regarding rights. Moreover, I find that this decrease in
blame for the government leads independence supporters to offer less support for political
parties which support equal pay, in comparison to EU supporters. Hence, the EU frame
can move opinions about equal pay to the extent that citizens blame their government for
bad conditions regarding inequality in pay. These results were stronger in the Federation
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of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in comparison to the Republika Srpska. On the other hand,
the EU framing of the equal treatment of gay people or bad conditions in Bosnia
regarding the treatment of gay people did not move opinions. The implications of the
findings are discussed in the chapter.
1.6 LEGITIMACY FOR THE EU’S GAY RIGHTS STANDARDS
From the data in the previous chapter, gay rights are revealed to be much less
popular in comparison to women’s rights, suggesting that gay people face a more
marginalized status in Bosnia. Hence, gay people have especially high stakes in the EU’s
governance pertaining to human rights issues. Hence, in the third empirical chapter, I
unpack the attitudes towards the EU’s involvement in gay rights among those who
identify with gay people. A growing body of scholarly research shows that international
and regional institutions lack the public legitimacy that is often necessary to address
human rights adequately (Hafner-Burton 2014; Pegram 2010; Hathaway 2002; 2007;
Falkner et al. 2006). The European Union, often touted as a powerful regional institution,
has taken up the monitoring, standard-setting, and enforcement of human rights
principles throughout its member states. As the EU expands its membership, EU officials
require applicant states to adopt their human rights standards. However, in practice,
human rights standards are often window dressing in the applicant states, where
normative commitments to rights are weak (Falkner et al 2008; Avdeyeva 2010).
Governments pass the laws required by the EU, but they do not invest the resources to
adequately implement the laws. Ostensibly weak commitments to human rights provide
a puzzle for scholars and policymakers: if EU human rights standards have minimal
consequences, then what would explain support for giving powers concerning human
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rights to the EU? This puzzle has major ramifications for marginalized people because it
suggests that rights are less effective if they are governed by the EU.
Existing research on the adoption of human rights regimes often focuses on
bargaining among governments regarding human rights agreements, and public opinion
studies focus on citizens’ recognition of human rights violations (Moravcsik 2000;
McFarland and Mathews 2005; Hafner-Burton 2008; Davis et al. 2012). What the
existing research misses is a comparison of opinions among the stakeholders of human
rights: people who associate with marginalized peoples affected by human rights
policies, and people who disassociate with the affected groups. In particular, state
institutions produce the marginalized status of gay people via political homophobia (for
instances, national identities defined in opposition to homosexuality, and laws which
privilege heterosexual relationships) (Canaday 2009; Bernstein et al 2009; Bosia and
Weiss 2013). Hence, human rights abuses can stem centrally from state institutions,
which marginalizes people within populations (Hafner-Burton 2014). I expect that those
who identify more closely with gay people are more likely to support transferring control
of gay rights to the EU.
In this chapter I gauge public support for the transfer of authority over gay rights
policies to the European Union. The analysis is based on an original survey of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, a country applying for EU membership. Bosnia is a theoretically
appropriate case because applicant states face the political choice of submitting to the
authority of EU institutions with regards to human rights policies (the potential of new
EU legislation regarding rights, with which politicians and voters may agree or disagree).
Homophobia is acute in Bosnia in comparison to other European states, so gay people
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have a high stake in the antidiscrimination policies prescribed by the EU (ILGA-Europe
2013; Human Rights Watch 2014). Furthermore, the Bosnian state is cross national with
two governing regions (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika
Srpska) so a representative sample of Bosnia allows me to test the robustness of the
hypotheses across two distinct national contexts. I operationalize identification with gay
people by asking respondents how closely (or not) they associate with the ideas and
values subjectively ascribed to gay people.
I find that closer identification with gay people associates with greater support for
transferring control of gay rights to the EU. On the other hand, the effects of trusting the
EU on support for EU control of gay rights were not substantially larger among those
who closely associate with gay people. As a further test of the argument, I examine
whether dissatisfaction with the government produces greater support for political parties
espousing human rights for gay people. Satisfaction with governing institutions should be
a more important consideration when those who feel close to gay people decide on their
support for gay rights-friendly parties. The effects of government dissatisfaction on
support for gay-friendly parties were larger among those who closely associate with gay
people, in comparison to those who do not associate with gay people. As robustness
check, I estimated the models which treated support for transferring control of women’s
rights as the dependent variable, which theoretically should not associate as strongly with
one’s feelings of closeness to gay people. One’s association with gay people does not
correlate with this women’s right variable; suggesting that the interests of gay people are
specified towards the EU’s control of gay rights as opposed to EU control of domestic
policies generally. Overall, this study sets out a normative challenge for the EU to
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provide (material and informational) assistance to gay citizens: helping marginalized
people who exhibit greater support for the EU’s governance.
1.7 CONCLUSIONS
This project seeks to explain the influence of the EU accession process on public
attitudes in the candidate states. While much of the existing studies focus on the influence
of domestic political attitudes on support of European integration, this project contributes
to political science research by studying the influences of the EU on the domestic
political attitudes. Moreover, while previous research has focused on shared beliefs
between individuals and the EU policies, I assess the EU’s normative pull in the minds of
citizens.
This project also explores the influence of EU criteria on the importance that
citizens ascribe to gender equality. EU accession may change candidate government’s
domestic political context by shaping public attitudes towards EU policies. This project
also contributes to gender studies by identifying conditions that can lead a populace to
deepen its support for gender equality. The EU criteria may become focal points around
which constituencies can mobilize for/against policy positions; potentially increasing the
government’s electoral costs of keeping the status quo. Hence, the EU’s leverage in its
enlargement process may be contingent upon mass political sentiments. The project
methodologically contributes to EU research and EU enlargement studies by using
population-based survey experiments in order to assess attitudes of citizens. This project
also points out the need for the EU to be more directly involved in helping women and
gay people in the form of resources (information, counselling, shelters), because the EU
may lead to a more negative impression on some people. Hence, the EU needs to actively
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help marginalized people with its funds, and also promote rights as for and by the people
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and not as a method to make people more “European” or
acceptable to Western Europe.
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CHAPTER 2
DOES THE “CARROT ON THE STICK” WORK? HOW THE CRITERIA
FOR EUROPEAN UNION MEMBERSHIP AFFECT SUPPORT FOR
GENDER EQUALITY
The European Union establishes equal pay for equal work between women and
men as a criterion for applicant states that are trying to join. Conventional wisdom holds
that governments meet these criteria in order to gain perceived benefits of membership.
Existing research also holds that legal changes to meet the EU’s criteria have not been
followed by normative commitments to women’s rights in the applicant states. These
studies do not gauge the public’s response to gender equality when it is framed as a
criteria, where advancing gender equality is necessary for EU membership. The
accession process entails states trying to join the European Union. Ostensibly, this
political process has special aspects that need to be unpacked if we are to understand the
environment in which opinions are forming. The EU sets up conditions for membership,
and applicant states choose to comply, to some extent. The EU dangles a “carrot on a
stick” in terms of the government’s perceived benefits of membership (the government
has to pass legislation in order to become a member), and the voters who support or
oppose governments and EU accession. Within the minds of all the players, there is
some degree of uncertainty over membership and the uncertainty over the importance of
complying with the standards. The aforementioned factors may be consequential for the
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EU’s policy standards like gender equality which have tremendous implications for
people’s day to day lives. Do these policy standards, the “stick”, and the uncertainty over
standards help move opponents of gender equality in favor of the standards, or is the EU
antagonizing these opponents?
2.1 THE EUROPEAN UNION, GENDER EQUALITY, AND ENLARGEMENT
Public opinion studies of gender equality often share the goal of uncovering the
predispositions that lead people to exhibit greater support for women’s rights (see Burns
and Gallagher, 2010). Existing public opinion research suggests that women’s sense of
interdependence with other women (group consciousness) associates with greater support
for gender equality (Sears and Huddy, 1986; Conover, 1988; Rhodebeck, 1996). Conover
(1988) shows that interdependence increases support for equal pay, affirmative action for
women, and government intervention on behalf of women. Among men, Sapiro and
Conover (2001) find that belief in gender equality within the family increases support for
a gender neutral draft. Rhodebeck (1996) finds that feelings of closeness towards women
as a group increase one’s belief in equal roles between women and men. Other studies
suggest that partisanship and ideology associate with increased support for gender issues
(Sulfaro 2007).
The aforementioned studies explain support for gender equality with personal and
intra- national variables. However, international political forces have become more
influential in women’s rights. Over the past few decades, international agreements
concerning women’s rights have proliferated and they created new bodies of law and
institutions which ostensibly address gender equality. Examples include the United
Nation’s Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

27

(CEDAW) and the EU’s regulations regarding equal treatment between women and men
in the workplace, as well as promoting of protections against domestic violence
(Avdeyeva 2010; Weldon 2006; Montoya 2013). What remains unexplored is whether
international agreements concerning gender equality influence people’s attitudes and
behavior pertaining to women’s rights. The goal of these agreements is improving the
lives of women. Hence, the ramifications of adopting these agreements on the opinions of
citizens needs exploration. International and regional institutions should hope that
citizens agree (or became agreeable) with their conventions and treaties.
The enlargement of the European Union provides a context where one can study
the EU’s normative pull on domestic constituencies regarding gender equality rules. The
EU has developed one of the strongest gender equality regimes in the world. When
countries join the EU, they must incorporate a series of gender equality rules into their
national legislation, which are promoted in terms of EU membership by European
Commission officials (who monitor candidate state progress) and civil society groups.
The decision by governments to enter the EU accession process and adopt policies
introduces new ideas and commitments in domestic politics. Complying with the EU is
an important public debate in applicant states, especially in terms of compliance with
human rights principles like gender equality. In applicant states, EU officials engage the
public with civil society dialogues. EU officials, government officials, civil society
groups elicit feedback from citizens about proposed policy changes and outline how the
adoption of EU standards is the price of EU membership (Roth, 2008; Council of the
European Union, 2010; European Commission, 2005; 2008). The EU’s goal is “giving
everyone a voice in EU enlargement”, after the 2004 enlargement was criticized for
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involving reform processes where citizens were neither informed nor prepared (European
Commission 2005; 2008). But what do citizens in applicant states think about EU
enlargement?
Public opinion studies on EU enlargement indicate that one’s wealth and
education level increase one’s favorability towards the EU (see Szcerbiak 2001). In
Turkey, Carkoglu (2003) finds that increased education, leftist sentiments, and the
electoral fragmentation (more competing parties) associate with European integration
support; while strong religious sentiments associate with decreased support for European
integration. For post-Communist countries, Tucker et al. (2002) suggest that free market
supporters, the ‘winners’ of integration, are more likely to support EU membership.
Existing studies also show the strong influence of subjective national problems on
opinion formation concerning the EU. Sanchez-Cuenca’s (2000) analysis of the
Eurobarometer indicates negative opinions towards national political system and positive
opinions towards supranational institutions translate into support for European
integration. Other scholars examine how domestic political sentiments like partisanship,
support for incumbents, and satisfaction with the government influence attitudes on
European integration (Gabel, 1998a; Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Kritzinger, 2003).
Kritzinger (2003) argues that support for the EU results from perceptions of national
problems, and McLaren (2007) indicates that perception of cultural threats in the national
context explains hostility towards the European Union (hostility towards
multiculturalism). Ehin’s (2001) public opinion research on Central and Eastern Europe
indicates that publics hold various levels of support for the European Union, and that
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opinions on the EU are wrapped up in support and opposition for the national
government.
However, the question of whether the EU changes people’s perception of
domestic problems is unclear. As the EU grows more and more influential in people’s
lives, we do not know the EU’s influence on people’s opinions on issues like gender
equality. Montoya (2013) in From Global to Grassroots provides a foundational study
on the normative impact of the European Union by examining efforts to combat domestic
violence in Central and Eastern Europe. Montoya shows that normative measures matter
in changing policies on domestic violence. Human rights frames of domestic violence,
espoused by EU officials, helped disseminate policies in CEE countries. The framing of
domestic violence in terms of the EU (especially from EU officials lobbying and
discussing reforms with government officials) promoted normative commitment among
state officials. Montoya (2013) contends that policies need to move beyond rhetoric,
assess state and local implementation capacities, commit to reforms (with necessary
resources), and incorporate perspectives from the grassroots (251-252). Obstacles to these
goals include public attitudes on gender equality and domestic violence (250). A
normative commitment from the populace is important for improving chances of
implementation, alongside the legal commitment of state leaders.
Maier and Rittberger (2008) examine opinion formation about EU enlargement
while framing issues in terms of a cultural match with EU countries. They test competing
explanations for support for EU enlargement, including economic, democracy, and
cultural identity. In their experiment with students at the University of Kaiserslautern,
Maier and Rittberger (2008) prime a cultural mismatch by emphasizing cultural
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difference between the European Union and Macedonia before asking the respondents
whether they would support Macedonian EU membership. The cultural mismatch prime
produced the largest negative effect among their results. Their research suggest that
subjective cultural identity influences the attitudes of Europeans towards expanding EU
membership. However, what is missing in the study of EU enlargement is research into
whether the EU’s conditions influence people in applicant states. he EU also aspires to
promote normative commitment among leaders and the public. None of the
aforementioned studies empirically test whether citizens express attitudes about gender
equality differently when they consider the EU’s standards for membership. Does the
prospect of EU membership influences the ways that people in aspiring members think
about policies such as gender equality? Does the EU’s sponsorship of reform move
people’s opinions on gender equality when people perceive benefits from the EU?
Existing research does not present evidence about whether the EU is a consideration for
beneficiaries from membership when they form their opinions.
2.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
The European Union applies conditionality to governments that aspire to join.
EU membership is conditional upon these governments passing legislation in order to
align their legal framework with EU. Hence, the incentives of membership motivate
governments to comply with the EU’s conditions (Vachudova 2005). The EU uses the
potential benefits of membership as leverage to promote reform (Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier 2005). The transposition of gender equality laws has been successful, and the
European Commission has approved social policies in the membership negotiations
despite inconsistent implementation (Avdeyeva 2007; 2010).
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European Union faces a lack of cooperation with EU rules. The EU is external
institution, and has leverage over applicant governments that desire EU membership
because the governments see benefits in joining. Hence, the EU can sanction when it
puts up roadblocks on the path to achieving the perceived benefits of membership.
Figuring out the public’s reaction to the EU’s conditions is important, because EU
ministers and the European Commission demand reforms as the price of membership.
This ‘carrot on the stick’ approach to reform has yielded effective legal change, but we
do not know whether the approach influences citizens’ opinions on the rules the EU tries
to promote (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). The EU lacks the legitimacy often
associated with the domestic institutions that prescribe policies. Without an electoral
connection with the public or the credibility of sanctioning powers reflected in domestic
institutions, cooperation with standards may be less likely (Dal Bo et al 2010). The EU
possesses some leverage over the behavior of governments to the extent that people in
applicant states feel that the EU will provide benefits. Those who perceive benefits from
EU membership should respond more favorably to the EU’s criteria, in comparison to
those who do not. EU officials should hope that they help the causes they promote and
not hurt them.
H1: Citizens who perceive economic benefits from EU membership are
more likely to support gender equality, when they are told that gender
equality is a criteria for EU membership.
The previous arguments suggested that the motivation to align one’s view with the
EU lay in one’s potential gains: benefits from membership and a better political system.
They did not indicate that the values regarding gender equality would shift, among those
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who oppose gender equality. As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier put it, the EU’s values
resonate in the domestic context.
Individuals can share common values (or not) with the EU’s standards for
membership. Attitudes about the EU’s criteria like gender equality establishes “the stick”
in one’s mind, where one sees a path to the EU’s benefits by expressing pro-gender
equality attitudes that pressure government to meet the criteria of membership.
Individuals who perceive benefits from EU membership (in other words, those who
perceive the “carrot on the stick” tactic), are the main stakeholders in the connection
between gender equality and EU membership. Hence, those of key theoretical concern
for this project are individuals who see the “carrot” (the benefits of EU membership), and
feel they may need to conform their expressed attitudes to the EU standards. Among
them, people who disagree with gender equality principles are more likely to perceive
“the stick”. Those who perceive benefits and are opponents of gender equality should
perceive the conditionality, and respond positively to gender equality, aligning
themselves with a policy that advances EU membership.
H2: Citizens who 1) disagree with gender equality principles and 2)
perceive economic benefits from EU membership are more likely to
support gender equality, when they are told that gender equality is a
criteria for EU membership.
2.3 RESEARCH DESIGN
In order to test the hypotheses, I use data from an original survey conducted in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 2015 with a representative sample of 997 respondents.
The nationally representative sample of Bosnia and Herzegovina was recruited by Ipsos.
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The sample includes 997 adults (18+). The response rate was 64 percent. Ipsos uses
random iterative weighting (RIM) in order to offset sampling biases with regards to sex,
age, ethnicity, and rural/urban settlements.The survey consisted of face-to-face,
computer-assisted interviews. The survey was carried out in Bosnia, which is a state
trying to join the EU. Bosnia is a theoretically appropriate case because its citizens and
leaders face the political choice to try to join the EU (or not) and share control over
domestic policies with the EU.
In the survey experiment, the sample of Bosnian citizens were randomly assigned
to a treatment group and a control groups, described below. The experimental
manipulation is a media statement (or vignette) about a public debate in Bosnia. In the
vignettes, I use gender equality as the issue of the public debate (equal pay for equal
work, a criterion for EU membership). In the hypothetical media statements, civil society
groups propose that the state trains more labor inspectors who can help enforce equal pay
between men and women (see the Appendix for exact wording).
Gender equality issues are included in the accession process in a number of ways.
Schwellnus (2005) argues that “nondiscrimination can be regarded a clear and well
established norm at the EU level” (55). The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) empowered the
EU to “take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation” (Schwellnus 2005, 55).
The EU laws that candidates need to transpose include: directives on equal pay, equal
treatment in the workplace, equal treatment with regard to statutory social security
schemes and occupational social security schemes, equal treatment for self-employed and
their assisting spouses, protection of pregnant workers, organization of working time,
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parental leave, burden of proof in sex discrimination cases, and part-time work (Galligan,
Clavero and Calloni 2007).
The European Commission’s progress reports on the candidate states of the
2004/2007 enlargements suggest that the implementation of gender equality policy was
not a credible condition for membership, because implementation was scant across the
countries that still became members (some degree of legislative enactment was enough
for the European Commission) (Falkner and Treib 2008). According to Avdeyeva (2010),
EU candidates theoretically have faced similar EU incentives and potential punishment,
and “we find variation in the levels of their domestic legislative and institutional reform”
(205).
Because gender equality is an issue that (although a requirement for membership)
has received limited commitments from candidate governments and the EU, I expect that
citizens are less likely to draw a connection between the gender equality and the EU (the
topic of the experimental vignettes) without prompting. I find the expected weak
association between opinions about equal pay and perceptions of EU benefits (see Table
1). Therefore, for gender equality, I can more credibly cue the salience of this issue for
EU membership advancement (respondents are less likely to be ‘pre-treated’ through
their previous experiences) (Gaines and Kuklinski 2011, 456).
For treatments in this experiment, I use the newspaper article vignettes, which
discuss a gender equality criterion, equal-pay-for-equal-work, in a public debate. A
proposal for promoting equal-pay-for-work is made by the participants in the debate. The
design has four experimental groups and two treatments. For the first treatment, I
manipulate whether or not the equal pay proposal is addressed as advancing a bid for EU
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membership in a public debate (Emphasis Treatment). For the second treatment, I
manipulate whether or not meeting the membership criteria is important for achieving
membership, as suggested by a European Union official: either guaranteeing
membership (Certainty Treatment) or saying that meeting the criteria is important (see
the wording in the Appendix). The difference in equal pay support between 1) those who
are primed to think they will get into the EU and 2) those who are primed to think there
are hoops to jump through in order to gain membership represents the “conditionality
effect”.
The dependent variable is support for the equal pay proposal, and this is a additive
measure with three survey items regarding 1) support for the proposal, 2) vote choice if a
party supported the proposal, and 3) one’s willingness to pay higher taxes to implement
the proposal (each are measured on a zero to four scale). For the support measure, 58
percent of the respondents supported the proposal (‘Strongly supported’ or ‘Supported’
on the 5 point scale). For the vote choice measure, 42 percent of the respondents were
likely to vote for the party (‘Much more likely’ or ‘Somewhat more likely’ on the 5 point
scale). For the taxes measure, 20 percent of the respondents were willing to pay more
taxes to achieve the proposal (‘Very willing’ or ‘Willing to some extent’ on the 5 point
scale). The additive score is measured on a scale of zero to twelve (twelve represents
those who are very supportive of equal pay). The score has a mean of 6.8 and a standard
deviation of 2.2 (the modal category is six with 23 percent of the respondents). I have
two experimental treatments, creating a “two by two design”, so I have an interaction
effect in the statistical models to represent those who received both treatments. I expect
that these effects are conditional upon respondent characteristics, such as support for
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gender equality, so I asked a set of survey items before the treatment. The order of these
questions was randomized for the respondents in order to alleviate priming effects. I
created triple interactions in these models. The triple interaction includes the two
treatments and perceiving economic benefits, measured with a dummy variable with
“one” representing those who think that benefits are unlikely or somewhat unlikely (59
percent of the respondents) and “zero” representing those who think that benefits are
likely or somewhat likely (41 percent of the respondents). For hypothesis two,
opposition to equal pay is measured with a dummy variable with “one” representing
those who strongly agree or agree with the idea that men should be paid more than
women for the same job (7 percent of the respondents) and “zero” representing those who
strongly disagree or disagree with this idea (93 percent of the respondents).
2.4 RESULTS
I first examine the association between belief in economic benefits from EU
membership with policy evaluations of equal pay between women and men. These
associations may suggest that those who perceive benefits from the EU exhibit different
levels of support for equal pay for equal work. The data indicate that there is not a strong
correlation between the variables of interest. Table 1 shows the percentage of believers
in more pay for men is close to the percentage of believers among those who disagree
with idea that men should be paid more.
The different groups for equal pay evaluations and attributions had similar scores,
regardless of their status as a believer in men’s higher pay. These results suggest that
there is not a ‘consensus view’ on how gender equality opinions relate to one’s
perception of the EU as benefiting one’s economy. A large majority of citizens disagree
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with the idea that men should receive higher pay, but the minority of citizens who agree
with this idea present an impediment to gender equality principles (their responses to the
EU’s criteria may be consequential to the implementation of gender equality policies).
Tables 1 illustrates the possible ways in which EU economic benefit perceptions
and gender equality opinions are correlated. However, the causal order of the variables is
not clear. The experiment tests whether an EU frame and a frame regarding certainty
over EU membership informs the evaluation of gender equality policies. I then observe
how this treatment affects evaluations of gender equality by one’s perception that the EU
provides economic benefits. The expectation is that if believers in EU benefits are told an
issue is condition for EU membership, they will have more positive evaluations, in
comparison to those who do not belief in benefits. Table 2 shows the results, with an
OLS regression predicting evaluations of equal pay (on a 0-12 point scale, with 12
representing a very positive evaluation), with explanatory variables for the treatments and
EU benefit preference (dummy indicating belief in EU benefits), and an interaction
between the treatments and EU benefits perceptions.
Table 2 presents the results of the statistical model for the influence of the EU
emphasis and certainty treatments by one’s belief in the benefits of joining the EU. Table
2 shows an OLS regression predicting the evaluation on an equal pay proposal (on a 0-12
scale), with two independent dummy variables for the treatments (whether or not equal
pay is framed as an EU condition, and whether or not the EU conditions is credible), a
dummy variable for one’s perception of benefits from the EU, and the interaction
between the three. For interpretation of this triple interaction effect, Figure 1 shows the
emphasis treatment effects (when the EU specifies an issue as advancing EU
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membership). Figure 1 illustrates the size of the treatment effects on evaluations of the
equal pay proposals, among those who received the EU frame treatment (Figures 1 and 2
represent a three way interaction effect plot from the model in Table 2 – Figure 2
includes respondents who did not receive the EU frame treatment).
In the figures, we observe that the quantities of interest often are not
distinguishable from one another at the traditional levels of statistical significance.
Hence, my discussion of the results reflect the directions of the effect, although they are
not strong. Among those who believe that EU membership is beneficial, and receive an
EU emphasis on gender equality, they exhibit a higher level of support for gender
equality when they are told that meeting criteria is necessary. Among those who believe
that EU membership is not beneficial, and receive an EU emphasis on gender equality,
they exhibit a lower level of support for gender equality when they are told that meeting
criteria is necessary. Among those who believe in benefits, the positive effect from an
EU emphasis is conditional upon one’s belief that membership criteria are credible (as
received by a cue from EU officials).
Moving to Figure 2, I examine the respondents’ reactions to gender equality when
it is not emphasized as a condition for EU membership. Among those who believe that
EU membership is beneficial, and do not receive an EU emphasis on gender equality,
they do not exhibit a higher level of support for gender equality when they are told that
meeting criteria is necessary. Among those who believe that EU membership is not
beneficial, and do not receive an EU emphasis on gender equality, they do not exhibit a
lower level of support for gender equality when they are told that meeting criteria is
necessary. Overall, among those who believe in benefits, the positive effect from an EU
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emphasis is conditional upon receiving information saying that EU membership is
credible (as received by a cue from EU officials) and upon receiving a message saying
that gender equality reforms advance EU membership.
These results suggest that the EU’s conditionality has a polarizing effect among
those with varying stakes for the benefits of EU membership. These results suggest that
EU beneficiaries exhibit higher levels of support for the reform when it advances EU
membership. Credible conditionality improves commitment to gender equality for those
who believe in benefits, which suggests that their commitment is following the appeal of
the EU. Credible conditionality decreases commitment to gender equality for those who
do not believe in benefits, which suggests that the punitive nature of the ‘carrot on the
stick’ perturbs those who do not believe in benefits.
However, the aforementioned analysis does not incorporate prior beliefs about
gender equality which may shape perceptions of the equal pay proposal. Hence, I
estimated another statistical model (Table 3) which broke up supporters and opponents of
equal pay into those who perceive personal EU benefits and those who do not perceive
personal EU benefits (four groups). The results indicate that those who oppose equal pay
but perceive economic benefits from the EU do not exhibit higher levels of support for
gender equality when they are told that advancing gender equality is necessary to join the
EU. Hence, the results do not present evidence in favor of hypothesis two.
On the other hand, the results suggest that messages suggesting that eventual EU
membership is certain influences those who oppose equal pay but perceive economic
benefits from the EU (see Figure 3). When this groups receive the message saying the
membership is certain (put another way, the conditions for membership are not credible),
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they exhibit lower levels of support for equal pay when they do not receive an EU
emphasis. In other words, without an EU emphasis that ties the EU to gender equality and
without credible conditionality, opponents of gender equality offer less support for
gender equality.
In order to further test the effects from perceiving benefits, I examine the
treatment effects among those who both oppose equal pay and believe that benefits from
EU membership are unlikely. Those who oppose equal pay should perceive more of a
“stick”, because the EU is asking for policy changes with which they disagree. Those
who do not believe in benefits from EU membership do not perceive the “carrot” of
membership that theoretically appeals to those who believe in the benefits. Hence, those
who oppose equal pay and do not believe in benefits should respond more negatively to
the EU when conditionality is applied (asking an applicant country to jump through
hoops), in comparison to those who oppose equal pay and believe in benefits. Without
the “carrot”, applying conditionality would be perceived as even more costly when
someone disagrees with the issues behind the standards of membership. In order to
substantiate whether believing in benefits matters, I replicate Figure 3 among those who
do not believe in benefits and disagree with equal pay (see Figure 4). This group
responds negatively (in terms of support for equal pay) to the EU emphasis treatment
when they are told that meeting EU criteria are necessary for membership. Like those
who believe in benefits and oppose equal pay, this group responds positively to the EU
emphasis when they are told that EU membership is certain. This results suggests that
when respondents are told EU membership is certain, an EU emphasis tends to have a
positive effect on support for the equal pay proposal (when the enforcement of
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disagreeable policies is not primed). However, when respondents are told that meeting
conditions of membership is necessary, those who do not believe in benefits and oppose
equal pay respond more negatively to the EU emphasis (when potential costs are incurred
from meeting conditions, without potential benefits from joining). Overall, these results
suggest that the perception of benefits from membership matter when citizens form
opinions about the gender equality issues promoted by the EU.
2.5 CONCLUSIONS
This study represents the first attempt to test the relationship between perceptions
of economic benefits from the EU and support for the EU’s gender equality agenda. My
aim is to compare the different ways in which perceptions of economic EU benefits
moderates the relationship between the EU’s gender equality agenda and citizens’
support for gender equality. This relationship is critical for the rights of women, because
the EU’s policy interventions may bolster or undermine citizens’ support for women’s
rights. In order to examine these causal relationships, I conducted an innovative survey
experiment which randomized whether gender equality was addressed as an EU policy
and whether gender equality was a requirement for EU membership.
I examined two ways citizens can resolve the incongruity between their
preferences for economic benefits from the EU and their personal opinions about gender
equality. First, they can adjust their evaluations of the EU agenda to align with their
belief in benefits from EU membership. Second, they can adjust their opinions about
gender equality based on how credible they see the EU’s conditions for membership. If
they believe that their country will advance towards membership, with or without gender
equality reforms, then they lack the incentive to adjust their preferences. On the other
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hand, if they feel they must the criteria in order to join the EU, they may conform their
views in order to advance their country towards membership.
The findings lend mixed support for these posits. The findings were not robust to
traditional levels of statistical significance, but I did find that those who perceived
benefits from the EU where less likely to support gender equality when they were told
that EU membership was certain, and more likely to support gender equality when they
were told that membership was conditional upon adopting gender equality. I unpacked
this effect by examining support for equal pay by one’s support for EU economic
benefits. Those who believed in men’s higher pay and benefits from EU membership
were less likely to support equal pay policies when they are told that EU membership is
certain and when they are not told that equal pay is an EU issue. The EU’s rights agenda
seems less appealing to opponents of gender equality who perceive benefits, when
standards for membership are not presented as credible. By removing “the stick”, and
making the “carrot” attainable without compliance with EU standards, the opponents of
gender equality who perceive benefits are more likely to take an anti-gender equality
position.
This study makes three major contributions. First, existing research (showing an
association between different attitudes and support for the EU) assumes that the EU
matters for people, and that in some way, it can govern opinions when different issues are
considered. However, another body of research shows that people are unresponsive to
the EU, and consider EU issues to be secondary to national issues. This project suggests
that the EU moves opinion, eliciting effects on expressed attitudes. People hold varying
opinions about the EU and the issues at stake in the EU accession process, and they move
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their opinion based on their prior beliefs: more favorability towards gender equality
when they perceive EU benefits and against gender equality when they do not perceive
EU benefits.
Second, the politics of the EU accession process matter as well. Conditionality
matters for those who perceive benefits from the EU. Opinions move towards EU equal
pay policies when believers in benefits are told that these policies will fulfill the EU’s
requirements. Future studies can replicate this study over time in order to see whether the
EU’s interventions in policies has a lasting effect on public opinion. On the other hand,
communicating the conditionality of EU policies to officials, lobbyists, or the public may
have some counterproductive effects for the EU, where those who think benefits are
unlikely may oppose EU standards.
On the other hand, perceiving a guaranteed pathway to membership, may
undermine the credibility of the EU’s rights agenda. In other words, without signals that
indicate that standards are credible and necessary for membership, the opponents of
gender equality (who are impediments to gender equality principles in society) may offer
less support for the EU’s equal pay policies, even if they think EU membership is
beneficial. Future studies can unpack the effects of this perceived credibility by asking
citizens whether they believe the government will follow the EU’s standards. Moreover,
citizens may hold more negative biases against the EU if they are told “they have to jump
through hoops” (being asked to follow policies they dislike in order to achieve
membership). Overall, the results suggest that the EU can be a divisive force in applicant
countries, and EU officials should carefully consider its messaging in the EU accession
process.
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Third, this project advances the scholarship on domestic support for international
organizations by experimentally testing the influence of the EU on opinion formation
among citizens, as opposed to establishing correlations with observational data (Gabel
1998). Hence, this project also advances research on Europeanization by specifying and
testing a causal link between the EU and attitudes on domestic policies (Schimmelfennig
and Sedelmeier 2005). By examining the role of international organizations in opinion
formation, this project elucidates the impact of transnational actors on state-society
relations (affecting opinions on gender equality) (Risse 2010). EU-based opinion
formation, if it exists, implies a changing relationship between citizens and a
supranational polity; where one’s attention shifts away from the state government and
towards a new political center (Haas 1958).

45

Table 2.1: Percentages of survey responses by evaluations of EU economic
benefits and one’s belief that men should be paid more than women.
Agreeing that men should Disagreeing that men should
be paid more than women be paid more than women
Economic
3.3%
55.7%
benefits from
(30)
(506)
the EU likely
Economic
3.1%
37.9%
benefits from
(28)
(344)
the EU unlikely
Number of survey responses in parentheses. Source: September 2014
survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina
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Table 2.2: Determinants of support for an equal-pay-forequal-work policy proposal.
EU Benefits Unlikely
-0.5
(0.3)
EU Certainty Treatment
0.07
(0.3)
EU Emphasis Treatment
0.3
(0.3)
Certainty*EU Benefits Unlikely
-0.3
(0.4)
Emphasis*EU Benefits Unlikely
-0.7
(0.4)
Emphasis*Certainty
-0.4
(0.4)
Emphasis*Certainty*EU Benefits Unlikely
1.1*
(0.6)
Constant
7.1***
(0.2)
BIC
4,171
Survey Responses
926
R2
0.028
Dependent variable: Support for the proposal: 13-point scale.
EU Benefits Unlikely: 0 (Likely), 1 (Unlikely). Results
calculated using an OLS model. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.3: Determinants of support for an equal-pay-for-equal-work
proposal.
No EU Benefits & Support Equal Pay
-0.5
(0.3)
EU Benefits & Oppose Equal Pay
-0.4
(0.5)
No EU Benefits & Oppose Equal Pay
-0.9
(1)
EU Certainty Treatment
0.1
(0.3)
EU Emphasis Treatment
0.3
(0.3)
Certainty*No EU Benefits & Support Equal Pay
-0.2
(0.5)
Emphasis*No EU Benefits & Support Equal Pay
-0.5
(0.5)
Certainty*EU Benefits & Oppose Equal Pay
-1.6**
(0.7)
Emphasis*EU Benefits & Oppose Equal Pay
0.02
(0.7)
Certainty*No EU Benefits & Oppose Equal Pay
-2.3
(1)
Emphasis*No EU Benefits & Oppose Equal Pay
-1.8
(1)
Emphasis*Certainty
-0.4
(0.4)
Emphasis*Certainty*No EU Benefits & Support Equal Pay
0.9
(0.7)
Emphasis*Certainty*EU Benefits & Oppose Equal Pay
1.6
(1)
Emphasis*Certainty* No EU Benefits & Oppose Equal Pay
3.5*
(1.8)
Constant
7.1***
(0.2)
BIC
4,125
Survey Responses
908
2
R
0.046
Dependent variable: Support for the proposal: 13-point scale. EU
Certainty Treatment, EU Emphasis Treatment, and
Emphasis*Certainty represent effects for those who perceive personal
EU benefits and support equal pay, the baseline category. Results
calculated using an OLS model. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4

Level of support for equal pay

8

Expected value of equal pay support by treatment groups
and the belief that EU benefits are likely (black) and unlikely (grey)

Must Meet
EU Conditions

EU Membership
Certain

Must Meet
EU Conditions

EU Membership
Certain

-1

Difference in support for equal pay
0

1

Difference in support for equal pay
(Treatment effects of the EU criteria treatments)

EU benefit likely

EU benefit unlikely

Figure 2.1: Support for equal pay for equal work by treatment
groups and belief in EU benefits, with 90% CIs (EU emphasis
frame given). Support for equal pay: 0-12 scale. Expected values
and difference estimated when respondents are given an EU
emphasis.
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Expected value of equal pay support by treatment groups
and the belief that EU benefits are likely (black) and unlikely (grey)

Must Meet
EU Conditions
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Certain
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Difference in support for equal pay
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Difference in support for equal pay
(Treatment effects of the EU criteria treatments)

EU benefit likely

EU benefit unlikely

Figure 2.2: Support for equal pay for equal work by treatment
groups and belief in EU benefits, with 90% CIs (EU emphasis NOT
given). Support for equal pay: 0-12 scale. Expected values and
difference estimated when respondents are not given an EU emphasis.
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Level of support for equal pay
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Expected value of equal pay support by treatment groups:
EU membership certainty (black) and meeting EU criteria (grey) treatments

EU Emphasis

No EU Emphasis
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Difference in support for equal pay
(Treatment effects of the EU emphasis treatment)

Those Receiving the
EU Membership Certainty Treatment

Thosing Receiving the
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Figure 2.3: Support for equal pay for equal work by treatment
groups, among those who believe in EU benefits and oppose equal
pay, with 90% CIs. Support for equal pay: 0-12 scale. Expected
values and difference estimated while holding the model at 'believing
in EU benefits' and 'opposing equal pay'.
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8

Expected value of equal pay support by treatment groups:
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Figure 2.4: Support for equal pay for equal work by treatment groups,
among those who do not believe in EU benefits and oppose equal pay,
with 90% CIs. Support for equal pay: 0-12 scale. Expected values and
differences estimated while holding the model at 'not believing in EU
benefits' and 'opposing equal pay'.

52

CHAPTER 3
HOW CITZENS REACT TO THE EUROPEAN UNION’S HUMAN
RIGHTS AGENDA: GENDER EQUALITY AND GAY RIGHTS IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
The previous chapter suggests that effects from the considerations of EU
conditionality and meeting standards did not have a strong influence on opinions about
policy proposals regarding women’s rights. On the other hand, messages that guarantee
membership may have positive effects on the policy proposals. However, we also need
to further unpack what happens when rhetoric and political messaging weds the EU with
human rights, especially when the existing research suggests that the EU faces challenges
in terms of ensuring domestic commitments to human rights. In this chapter, I evaluate
citizen reactions to the EU’s promotion of human rights. In particular, I examine how
supporters of EU membership and supporters of their state’s independence respond
differently to the EU’s promotion of human rights.
A growing body of research indicates that citizens do not pay attention to the EU
level of governance and citizens do not respond to information provided by the EU (Hix
and Marsh 2007; Hix and March 2011; Schmitt 2005; de Vreese et al. 2006; Hobolt et al.
2013). An explanation for this unresponsiveness, suggested by a number of studies, is
that multilevel governance in the EU (as well as divided governance within states) makes
it difficult for voters to figure out who to hold responsible for policy successes and
failures (Anderson 2000; De Vries et al. 2011; Hellwig 2001; Hellwig and Samuels 2008;
Powell and Whitten 1993). These findings substantiate the claims of scholars who argue
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that the EU possesses a democratic deficit. For instance, Follesdal and Hix (2006) argue
that:
Psychologically, the EU is too different from the domestic democratic
institutions that citizens are used to. As a result citizens cannot understand
the EU, and so will never be able to assess and regard it as a democratic
system writ large (536).
Follesdal and Hix (2006) present a bleak interpretation of citizens’ abilities to engage in
EU politics. Citizens ostensibly do not assess policies in terms of the EU’s involvement.
However, these studies do not indicate whether deeper integration or the EU’s policy
agenda inform voters’ choices or opinion formation. Ideally, for the EU, prescribed
policies such as human rights lead to deeper normative commitments to the EU’s agenda
and meaningful implementation.
The aforementioned research on the politics of EU member states applies to
applicant states as well. Citizens of applicant states encounter information about the EU
and how their state may join this political system, and these citizens debate whether their
state belongs in the EU. Questions pertaining to the EU’s salience for citizens, whether
citizens pay attention to the EU, and the appropriateness of EU’s policies are applicable
to the people in the applicant states, as well as the members. In the applicant states the
EU tells governments to adopt and implement its women’s rights standards, such as equal
pay between women and men (Hoskyns 1996; Ellina 2003; Montoya 2013). Adopting
EU laws in preparation for EU membership limits opportunities for reneging on their
government’s legal commitments to rights (Moravcsik 2000). Moravcsik (2002) points
out that an important justification for insulating policies from national governments is
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“the need impartially to dispense justice, equality and rights for individuals and minority
groups” (pp. 614). However, studies of the adoption and implementation process with
regards to social policies like women’s rights suggest that normative commitment to the
EU’s policies is weak, which hinders implementation (Falkner et al 2005; Avdeyeva
2010; Roth 2008).
Applicant state governments pass the gender equality laws required by the EU,
and set up gender equality institutions, but they do not commit the resources to address
the laws’ principles adequately (such as equal pay between women and men) (Roth
2008). Existing research indicates that civil society organizations and citizens that are
committed to women’s rights provide contexts where women’s rights policies are more
likely to succeed, because these groups provide information to pertinent government
officials and monitor/report on government activity (Falkner et al. 2005; Roth 2008).
Recently, the EU took up gay rights in the EU accession process (Rettman 2012;
European Parliament 2013). Commitment from applicant governments and civil society
to gay rights remains more tenuous in comparison to women’s rights, but O’Dwyer
(2013) argues that “EU pressure can effectively counter homophobia” (122-123).
However, public reactions to the EU’s involvement in rights policies is unexplored in the
existing research. Important elements of citizens’ toolkits for making political choices
are omitted in public opinion studies about the EU.
A large body of research suggests that citizens use the cues from leaders and
institutions to help make up their minds about who to vote for and the policies to support
(Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Brader and Tucker 2009; Tilley and Hobolt 2011;
Druckman et al. 2013). The consensus emerging from this research is that people may be
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relatively uninformed, but they generally make reasonable political choices (based, for
instance, on the political party associated with a candidate or a policy) (see Disch 2011).
In competitive democracies, political representation is an iterative process where elites
theoretically present reasoned alternatives (in terms of policy) which inform citizens’
opinions and political behavior (Disch 2011; Schattschneider 1960). Hence, an
institution can be judged as more democratically legitimate insofar as it does more to
mobilize objections from citizens (Disch 2011, 111). For instance, in a survey
experiment of U.S. citizens, Druckman et al. (2013) provide evidence of biased opinion
formation in favor of the policy agenda of one’s party, and against the policy agenda of
the opposing party (partisan polarization). Biased opinion formation is critical to this
study because predispositions towards favoring or opposing the EU may inform opinions
on human rights, similarly to the way partisan biases structure opinion formation.
Research on EU public opinion suggests that EU-based biases matter as well as
partisanship (Hobolt and Spoon 2012; Hobolt and Tilley 2014). However, Hobolt et al
(2013) suggest that citizens are unresponsive to information provided by the EU. I
extend the existing research by comparing those who are biased in favor of integration
with the EU and those who are biased in favor of national independence. Hobolt et al.
(2013) argue that group-serving biases in favor of one’s nation or the EU inform opinions
about responsibility assignment for different levels of government (pp. 157). They
suggest a continuum of bias with one side representing those who favor their nation and
not the EU, and the other side representing those who favor the EU and not their nation.
They operationalize these biases with a variable regarding EU support:
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Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it
already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your
views using a 0 to 10 scale. On this scale, 0 means unification ‘has already
gone too far’ and 10 means it ‘should be pushed further’ (Hobolt et al.
2013, 162).
However, this measurement does not directly incorporate opinions about group-serving
behavior for one’s nation. The EU can represent an ‘aspiration group’, the community of
states “to which [citizens] want to belong” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 19).
What is more, nations generally represent citizens’ primary aspiration group (Risse
2010). I expect group-serving behavior for nations among those who feel they belong in
their national community, and not the community of EU states (Carey 2002; Diez
Medrano 2003; Hooghe and Marks 2004). Hobolt et al. (2013) and Hobolt and Tilley
(2014) do not capture this orientation towards national independence in their
measurements.
The independence-oriented and EU-oriented factions in an applicant state should
be sensitive to the EU’s policy agenda which seeks to take control away from individual
states (for instance, if an applicant joins the EU, EU institutions could pass legislation
which contradicts state leaders). I argue that EU framed rights policies provide a cue for
citizens which helps them decide whether rights match their interests. Hence, those
favoring national independence theoretically are biased against rights that represent their
state’s integration with the EU. It follows that those who support national independence
should more negatively evaluate policies when they are framed as advancing their state’s
integration with the EU, in comparison to the EU’s partisans.
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H1: Those favoring national independence exhibit lower levels of support for
women’s rights and gay rights in comparison to EU supporters, when they are told
that the adoption of women’s rights and gay rights advances integration with the
EU.
Political institutions at the European and national levels have been more deeply involved
in promoting women’s rights in comparison to gay rights. Hence, citizens should
perceive EU frames of women’s rights as more credible, in comparison to EU frames of
gay rights. In other words, it is more (subjectively) believable that policy outcomes
regarding women’s rights would influence an applicant states advancement towards EU
membership, in comparison to gay rights. The survey here suggests that citizens assign
more responsibility to the EU for women’s rights in comparison to gay rights. On a 0 to
10 scale, with 0 representing no responsibility for the EU and 10 representing full
responsibility for the EU, the mean score was 7 for women’s rights and 4 for gay rights.
EU frames of women’s rights should elicit stronger biases based one’s predispositions
regarding EU membership.
Biases not only influence one’s views of policies but also influence one’s views
about whether the government should be held responsible for those policies (when one
learns a problem has occurred for that policy for instance) (Randolph 2006; Marsh and
Tilley 2010; Tilley and Hobolt 2011). Tilley and Hobolt (2011) show that biases in favor
of parties (in or out of government) inform whether one assigns responsibility to the
government for a policy’s good or bad developments. They argue that multilevel
contexts obscure the clarity of institutions’ responsibility for policy outcomes among
voters, and as a consequence; biases are more important for voters when they attribute
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blame to leaders for their policies (see Hobolt and Tilley 2014b). However, the argument
that multilevel contexts produce more biased political decision-making has not been
directly tested in the existing literature (Tilley and Hobolt 2011). If conditions are bad
for policies that advance EU integration, those who support national independence can
blame circumstance and not their government (which would be responsible for improving
conditions), and hence; they would assign less responsibility to their government in
comparison to those who support EU membership. It follows that EU partisans assign
more responsibility to the government when an EU policy is going badly, in comparison
to those who favor independence.
H2: EU supporters assign more responsibility to their national government for
problems with women’s rights and gay rights in their country in comparison to
those favoring national independence, when they are told that the adoption of
women’s rights and gay rights advances integration with the EU.
Hence, I expect that the EU not only influences one’s evaluations of a policy, but also
one’s opinion about which institutions are responsible for that policy. With higher levels
of responsibility assigned to their state (due to bad conditions regarding rights), citizens
should be more likely to vote for parties that will help meet the EU’s standards. This
expectation follows the constructivist research on the spread of international human
rights norms, which suggests that international organizations’ messages to states may not
influence the state directly (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).
Instead, international organizations may influence the state’s civil society, parties and
organizations addressing human rights abuses; which mobilize against the government.
Hence, publicizing the EU’s standards can encourage citizens to hold their state
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politicians to account for the EU’s policies, because of the blame citizens feel towards
their state due to bad conditions regarding the rights policies.
H3: To the extent EU supporters assign more responsibility to their national
government, they are more likely to support political parties that advance
women’s rights and gay rights, in comparison to those favoring independence.
3.1 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In order to test the hypotheses, I use data from an original survey experiment
conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 2015 with a representative sample of one
thousand respondents. The nationally representative sample of Bosnia and Herzegovina
was recruited by Ipsos. The sample includes 1000 adults (18+). The response rate was
67.8 percent. Ipsos uses random iterative weighting (RIM) in order to offset sampling
biases with regards to sex, age, ethnicity, and rural/urban settlements. If I estimate the
effects presented here without respect to the recommended weighting, the statistically
significant results hold at a 90 percent confidence level, as opposed to a 95 percent
confidence level, and my substantive interpretation of the results does not change. The
survey consisted of face-to-face, computer-assisted interviews. A survey experiment is
advantageous for examining the hypotheses, because it allows me to control the
information which the respondents receive, and the randomized treatments (exposure to
the information) allow me to make clearer causal predictions. I replicate the hypothesis
testing with two issue areas: equal pay for equal work between women and men, and the
equal treatment for gay people in the workplace.
Opinions about women’s rights and gay rights provide a point of comparison
between human rights, which show the relative unpopularity of gay rights and the
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marginalized status of gay people in Bosnia. For instances, 55 percent of respondents do
not think it is appropriate to report job promotions that discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation, 55 percent of respondents tend to not see the government as responsible for
the treatment of gay people, 66 percent of respondents said they would be less likely to
help lobby for gay rights if a gay rights activist asked them to help, and 72 percent of
respondents exhibit no feeling of closeness to gay people as a social group (1.5 percent
identify as extremely close to gay people as a group). For women’s rights, 33 percent of
respondents do not think it is appropriate to report job promotions that discriminate on
the basis of gender, 22 percent of respondents tend to not see the government as
responsible for gender inequality in pay, 28 percent of respondents said they would be
less likely to help lobby for women’s rights if a women’s rights activist asked them to
help, and six percent of respondents exhibit no feeling of closeness to women as a social
group (51 percent identify as extremely close to women as a group).
The experiment was carried out in Bosnia, which is a state trying to join the EU.
Hence, individuals face the political choice to support EU membership or remain more
independent. The experiment contains two stages. The first stage corresponds to
hypothesis one. Respondents are asked for their opinion about equal pay, and equal pay is
addressed as an EU standard (or not) before the respondents report their opinion
regarding this issue. I address rights as conditions for membership, because the
conditions represent the principles EU officials espouse for all members to share
including the applicant during the accession process. Political players including women’s
rights organizations frame policies in terms of ‘EU conditions’ in order to leverage for
support in the accession process (Roth 2007; 2008). The second stage corresponds to
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hypotheses two and three. The same respondents are randomly assigned to be in or out of
another treatment (producing four treatment groups). For the second treatment,
respondents are told that experts contend that Bosnia is worse in terms of gender
inequality in pay, in comparison to other European countries. In the control group,
respondents are not provided a message about the bad conditions. Afterwards,
respondents are asked about how much responsibility they assign to the government for
pay inequality. For hypothesis three, the respondents also are asked about their potential
support for political parties that want to spend the resources necessary to adequately
address inequality in pay. The same stages are used with respect to equal treatment for
gay people in the workplace. All respondents received questions for both women’s rights
and gay rights issues, and half of the respondents randomly received the equal treatment
questions first and half of the respondents received the equal pay questions first. The
same treatment and control groups corresponded for both issue areas. For instance, if one
received the ‘EU condition’ treatment for equal pay, they also received it for equal
treatment. All of the groups received questions about their support for EU membership
or national independence at the beginning of the survey, which allows me to divide the
sample into ‘EU supporters’ and ‘independence supporters’. The exact wording for the
survey is found in the Appendix.
3.2 RESULTS
I first examine the association between support for EU membership with policy
evaluations and attribution of responsibility. These associations may suggest that
independence supporters and EU supporters exhibit different levels of support for rights
policies and different levels of blame towards their government for rights. The data
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indicate that there is not a strong correlation between the variables of interest. Table 1
shows the mean evaluations scores (on a 0-10 scale) for equal pay between women and
men, and equal treatment of gay people. Table 2 shows the mean scores (on a 0-10)
scale) for attributions of responsibility for equal pay and equal treatment. Tables 1 and 2
include the respondents from the control groups that received no extra information (the
experimental treatments).
The different groups for equal pay evaluations and attributions had similar scores,
regardless of their status as a supporter of EU membership or not. For the equal
treatment of gay people, independence supporters tended to be less supportive than EU
supporters. Independence supporters also were less likely to assign responsibility to their
government for equal treatment in comparison to gay people. Government assignment
refers to the regional governments (entities), which have control over the implementation
of these workplace conditions and salary policies. These results suggest that there is not
a ‘consensus view’ on how these issues relate to EU membership.
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the possible ways in which EU membership preference,
evaluations of the issues and responsibility-assignment are correlated. However, the
causal order of the variables is not clear. With only observational data, I would not know
the extent the policy evaluations and responsibility-assignment causes membership
preferences, or to the extent they are themselves a product of one’s membership
preference. The experiment tests whether an EU frame for a policy informs the
evaluations of rights policies, as I provide voters with information on whether the rights
issue is a condition for EU membership. I then observe how this treatment affects
evaluations of rights by one’s preference for EU membership or state independence. The
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expectation is that if independence supporters are told an issue is a condition for EU
membership, they will have more negative evaluations, in comparison to EU supporters,
than if they were not told the issue is a condition for membership. Table 3 shows the
results, with two OLS regressions separately predicting evaluations of equal pay and
equal treatment (on a 0-10 point scale, with 10 representing a positive evaluation), with
explanatory variables for the treatment and EU membership preference (dummy
indicating support for EU membership), and an interaction between the treatment and EU
membership preference.
I do not find evidence in favor of hypothesis one, which posits that an EU frame
influences citizens’ evaluations of rights policies. The effect of the framing on rights
evaluations is not significantly conditioned by support for EU membership or
independence. Telling EU supporters that gender equality is a condition for EU
membership does not make them more likely to support gender equality. The models
suggest that support for equal pay and equal treatment may decrease among EU
supporters, although these effects neither statistically or substantively significant. These
effects hold across both issue areas, which suggests that considerations of the EU are not
biasing evaluations of equal pay and equal treatment, directly.
Table 4 shows two OLS regressions predicting the equal pay and equal treatment
responsibility-assignment scores (on a 0-10 scale), for the respondents, with two
independent dummy variables for the treatments (bad conditions information from an
expert compared to the reference category of no performance information, and the EU
frame treatment), a dummy variable for one’s EU membership preference, and the
interaction between the three.
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Figure 1 illustrates the size of the treatment effects on the responsibility attributed
to the government, among those who received the EU frame treatment (Figures 1 and 2
represent a three way interaction effect plot from the ‘equal pay’ model in Table 4).
Following the expectations, when independence supporters received negative information
concerning inequality in pay, the responsibility they assigned to the government
decreased, in comparison to EU supporters. The differences in expected values (the
bottom half of the figures) represent the treatment effect from the bad conditions
treatment. Figure 2 shows the expected values of the responsibility scores by the bad
conditions treatment and one’s status as an EU membership or state independence
supporter, among those who did not receive the EU frame treatment. Without the EU
frame, independence supporters and EU membership supporters responded similarly to
the bad conditions information. Both groups increased the responsibility they assigned to
the government, and the treatment effect sizes (the differences in expected values) for the
two groups were not statistically distinguishable. The evidence regarding equal pay, in
favor of Hypothesis 2, suggests that the EU frame influences the institutions towards
which citizens assign responsibility. The frame turns independence supporters away
from blaming their government for inequality in pay. The effect of the negative
evaluation treatment on evaluations of equal pay is conditioned by support for EU
membership or independence. However, this significant effect does not hold in the
model for the equal treatment of gay people.
Bosnia-Herzegovina is split into two autonomous regions (entities), which allows
for a further investigation into citizens’ responsibility-assignment. In the FBiH (which
has 11 parliaments) people theoretically are less sure of which level of government is
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responsible for human rights policies, in comparison to the RS (which has one
parliament). Biases with regards to support for EU membership or state independence
would help political decision-making in the absence of a clearer hierarchy of authority.
In Table 5, I created subsets for the two entities for the equal pay model in Table 4, and
the effects of the treatments are much larger (and with higher levels of statistical
significance) in the FBiH, in comparison to the RS. This evidence helps back up the
previous finding with regards to responsibility assignment, because the effects are
stronger in the FBiH where biases should be more important to opinion formation about
institutional responsibility.
Following hypothesis three, I examine the extent to which the changes in
responsibility assignment (from the equal pay model in Table 4) affect support for a
political party that supports the reforms necessary to ensure equal pay for equal work
(funding enough labor inspectors to monitor businesses). I use a structural equation
models, which follow Imai et al. (2010) approach to mediation analysis. Structural
equation models are appropriate because they allow me to test for an association between
the treatment effects in Figure 1 (changes in responsibility assignment) and support for a
rights-friendly party. I first estimate the effects of the bad conditions treatment on the
responsibility assigned to the government (Attribution to the Government), under the
condition of the EU frame. The results shown in Table 6 as the “mediating model” are
the same as the equal pay model in Table 4. Attribution to the Government serves as the
mediator. I expect that the bad conditions treatment affects Attribution, and this change
in Attribution in turn affects support for the feminist party.
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I previously showed that the bad conditions treatment produces a negative effect
on Attribution among those supporting independence, who absolve the government of
blame for problems with equal pay. On the other hand, the bad conditions treatment
produced a positive effect on Attribution among EU Membership Supporters, who blame
the government for problems with equal pay. I hypothesize that these treatment effects
influence support for feminist parties via Attribution. Biases regarding EU membership
are expressed through support for the feminist parties (which want to spend the resources
to implement equal pay adequately). For independence supporters, since they absolve the
government of blame for equal pay, they should be less likely to vote for feminist parties;
thereby hindering the EU’s reform agenda. For EU supporters, since they blame the
government for equal pay, they should be more likely to vote for feminist parties; thereby
furthering the EU’s reform agenda. In other words, effects from the EU frame on support
for women’s rights occur when respondents receive information about the conditions for
that policy (blaming or absolving the government based on EU biases).
I estimate “mediating” effects which suggest whether support for feminist parties
changes to some extent when the bad conditions affects the blame the government
receives for women’s rights. I estimate a ‘Mediating Model’ where Attribution is the
dependent variable (see Table 6). I also estimate an outcome model where I treat
Attribution as an explanatory variable and support for feminist parties as a dependent
variable. I hold the treatment effects at “1” (or “on”) in the Outcome Model. I take the
difference in the expected value of support for the feminist party between two models: 1)
one model where the value of Attribution equals the outcome from the Mediating Model
where the Bad Conditions Treatment is “1” (or “on”), and 2) one model where the value
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of Attribution equals the outcome from the Mediating Model where the Bad Conditions
Treatment is “1” (or “off”). I repeat this procedure twice: once for those supporting EU
membership (holding EU Membership Supporter at “1”) and once for those supporting
independence (holding EU Membership Supporter at “0”). These effects show the extent
to which the Bad Conditions Treatment influences support for feminist parties, due to the
extent that one blames the government for inequality in pay.
I estimated these effects using statistical simulations, and I present bar graphs
representing the effects in Figure 3. The grey difference values represent the
independence supporters, and black difference values represent EU supporters. To the
extent that independence supporters changed in Attribution from the Bad Conditions
Treatment, support for feminist parties decreased, in comparison to EU supporters. As
part of a robustness check, these findings hold when the dependent variable (support for
feminists) is replaced with two other variables: 1) willingness to call or email politicians
about equal pay if a women’s rights activist asked you, and 2) one’s support for letting
the EU have control over equal pay policies. EU supporters were more likely to contact
politicians and allow the EU to have control, while independence supporters were less
likely for both variables. If I estimate the effects from Figure 3 without the EU frame,
the increased blame among both independence and EU membership supporters (from
Figure 2) led to corresponding increases in support across the three outcome variables. If
I graph results without the EU frame, independence supporters and EU membership
supporters responded similarly to information regarding inequality pay. The EU frame
led independence supporters to blame the government for inequality in pay, and in turn
they tended to support parties and causes which align their country with the EU (although
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those effects were not statistically significant). Similar to the results in terms of
responsibility assignment, the effects on feminist party support among independence and
membership supporters were not distinguishable, when the respondents did not receive
the EU frame.
3.3 CONCLUSIONS
This study represents the first attempt to test the relationship between EU biases,
support for the EU’s rights agenda, and responsibility-assignment for problems
concerning gender equality and gay rights using experimental data. My aim is to
compare the different ways in which EU biases (in favor of EU membership or state
independence) moderates the relationship between the EU rights agenda and citizens’
support for those rights. This relationship is critical for the rights of marginalized groups,
because the EU’s policy interventions may undermine citizens’ support for rights. In
order to examine these causal relationships, I conducted an innovative survey experiment
which randomized whether a rights issue was addressed as an EU policy and whether the
policy outcomes for those rights were addressed as going badly. A survey of Bosnia
allowed for a comparison of treatment effects across its governing regions where biases
theoretically had stronger and weaker effects. Examining women’s rights and gay rights
allowed me to compare effects when the EU could signal a more or less credible
connection (respectively) between rights and Bosnia’s advancement to EU membership.
I examined three ways in which citizens can resolve the incongruity between their
EU biases and their preferences regarding issues that are on the EU agenda. Firstly, they
can adjust their evaluations of an EU-endorsed policy to align with their support for EU
membership or independence. Secondly, they also can adjust who they think is
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responsible for objective conditions concerning those policies, based on their EU biases.
If state independence supporters receive information concerning bad conditions, they can
blame circumstance and are less likely to blame their government, in comparison to those
who support EU membership. Thirdly, to the extent that one assigns responsibility to the
government, one can adjust their support for parties that propose reforms that improve
objective conditions.
The findings lend mixed support for these posits. I did not find evidence that
receiving information about the EU frame alone could trigger biases with regards to equal
pay and equal treatment. However, for equal pay between women and men, I did find
empirical support for the posit that citizens adjust who they think is responsible for
objective conditions when policies have the EU frame. The EU frame affected
independence supporters who absolved their government of blame for inequality in pay.
I also find evidence that those holding their government responsible for problems
regarding pay inequality also adjust their support for feminist parties. When
independence supporters absolve their government of blame, their support for parties and
causes that align their country with EU standards diminishes. I did not find evidence
showing an effect on opinions regarding the equal treatment of gay people.
These findings have important implications for the existing literature. The
argument that citizens are wholly unresponsive to the EU is shown to be inaccurate,
although evidence of responsiveness is limited. This study contributes to research on EU
biases by asking citizens whether they prefer independence from the EU, where other
major studies do not. The evidence here indicates citizens are more responsive to the EU
than the existing research suggests, because supporters of state independence exhibit
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biases against the rights the EU tries to promote. The EU frame provides a cue for
independence supporters to object to the government’s responsibility for this issue,
leading them also to object to feminist parties and causes. Meanwhile, EU membership
behave similarly when responding to information regarding pay inequality, whether or
not the EU endorses equal pay. When respondents consider inequality in pay, the EU
frame serves as a cue, helping independence supporters decide who to hold responsible
for inequality.
Biases in terms of EU membership are reflected in political behavior with respect
to evaluations of government blame, support for the EU’s women’s rights policies, and
whether the EU should control women’s rights policies. This study points scholarly
research to more examinations of citizen reactions to EU policy-making, which should
ask respondents in more countries about EU policies. In particular, this research agenda
points to a survey of the United Kingdom which is considering independence from the
EU. Does the EU frame of rights policies in a current EU member trigger biased
responses from those favoring membership or independence? This question has major
ramifications for democratic legitimacy in the EU. Following Disch (2011), citizens’
capacity to object to their leaders’ actions is an important component of democratic
legitimacy. If the established consensus holds in member states and citizens do not
respond to the EU, then EU policy-makers have an incentive to ignore citizens.
This project also contributes to the research on shaming states and the diffusion of
human rights, because it shows that the EU frame does not directly influence opinions
about equal pay. Instead, the EU frame does influence opinions to the extent that citizens
blame their government for bad rights conditions. The EU’s opponents may absolve the
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government and offer less support for rights-friendly institutions. Rights-friendly parties
and civil society organizations are necessary for meaningful policy implementation, but
independence supporters who absolve the government of blame may decrease their
support for rights-friendly political parties. Existing studies suggest that normative
commitment to the EU’s women’s rights standards is weak. This study suggests that the
EU’s own involvement may undermine normative commitments to the rights laws that
the EU is promoting, among state independence supporters. Marginalized groups (such as
women and LGBT people) cross these political affiliations and biased rights opposition
among any constituency may harm its marginalized members, who must live around
people who may feel less inclusive due to the EU. Hence, a future study including a panel
of respondents surveyed over time could test whether the EU’s involvement has a lasting
effect on opinion formation with regards to rights.
Furthermore, the limited evidence regarding effects on equal pay is further
substantiated by comparing Bosnia’s governing regional entities: the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS). The effects were
stronger in the Federation which was eleven governments within its territory (in
comparison to one for the RS). Hence, citizens in the Federation live in a context with
more obscured lines of authority, and biases become more important for resolving
incongruities between one’s policy preferences and real-world conditions (the problems
regarding equal pay). Tilley and Hobolt (2011) posit that selective attribution (biased
responsibility-assignment) would be more prominent in political systems where lines of
responsibility are murkier in comparison to systems with clearer lines of responsibility,
but until now there has not been evidence that directly tests whether the effect of these
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biases depend on one’s institutional context. This study contributes to the existing
literature by showing that biased responsibility assignment occurs more strongly in the
FBiH, where lines responsibility are less clear, in comparison to the RS.
This study suggests that the EU may influence support for equal pay between
women and men. However, EU frames did not affect support for the equal treatment of
gay people, or the level of responsibility assigned to the government for gay rights.
Hence, the backlash to gay rights from the EU’s involvement is not reflected in the
experimental evidence from this study (see O’Dwyer 2013). Future studies should
unpack the response of right wing political forces to gay rights legislation. It could be the
case that citizens mobilize in response to the messages of conservative leaders who
oppose the EU (which occurred in the Polish case), instead of messages of the EU
directly. A future experiment could gauge citizen support for gay rights when different
leaders provide information about gay rights (including EU officials, conservative
politicians, and neutral experts/officials).
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Table 3.1: Evaluations of equal pay and equal treatment by support for EU
membership, with 95% confidence intervals in brackets.
Mean evaluation of equal
Mean evaluation of the
pay between women and
equal treatment of gay
men
people
EU
8.5
5.3
membership
[8.2 – 8.8]
[4.8 – 5.7]
supporters
(343)
(315)

State
independence
supporters

8.3
[7.7 – 8.9]
(107)

4.4
[3.6 – 5.1]
(97)

Evaluation of equal pay: 0(men’s higher pay should increase) - 10(women
and men should have equal pay throughout society). Evaluation of equal
treatment: 0(it should be easier to fire gay people) – 10 (employers should
never be allowed to fire gay people because of their sexual identity).
Number of survey responses in parentheses. These data represent the
control groups, which did not receive additional “treatment” information.
Source: July 2015 survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina
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Table 3.2: Attributions of responsibility to the government for equal pay
and equal treatment by support for EU membership, with 95%
confidence intervals in brackets.
Mean attribution score Mean attribution score for
for equal pay between the equal treatment of gay
women and men
people
EU membership
6.5
4.3
supporters
[6.0 – 7.0]
[3.8 – 4.9]
(159)
(144)
State
independence
supporters

6.1
[5.2 – 7.0]
(54)

4.4
[3.2 – 5.5]
(49)

Attributions for equal pay: 0(No responsibility for the government) 10(Full responsibility for the government). Attributions for equal
treatment: 0(No responsibility for the government) – 10 (Full
responsibility for the government). Number of survey responses in
parentheses. These data represent the control groups, which did not
receive additional “treatment” information. Source: July 2015 survey of
Bosnia and Herzegovina
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Table 3.3: Effects on evaluations of equal pay between women and
men, and the equal treatment of gay people in the workplace.
Equal Pay
Equal Treatment
EU Frame Treatment
0.6
0.06
(0.4)
(0.6)
EU Membership Supporter
0.2
0.9*
(0.3)
(0.5)
EU Frame Treatment* EU
-0.6
-0.4
Membership Supporter
(0.4)
(0.7)
Constant
8.2***
4.4***
(0.3)
(0.4)
Survey Responses
904
828
R2
0.003
0.007
Evaluation of equal pay: 0(men’s higher pay should increase) 10(women and men should have equal pay throughout society).
Evaluation of equal treatment: 0(it should be easier to fire gay
people) – 10 (employers should never be allowed to fire gay people
because of their sexual identity). Results estimated using OLS
models. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4: Effects on attributions of responsibility to the government for
equal pay between women and men, and the equal treatment of gay
people in the workplace.
Equal pay
Equal treatment
EU Frame Treatment
2.0***
1.4**
(0.7)
(0.7)
Bad Conditions Treatment
0.7
1.1*
(0.7)
(0.6)
EU Membership Supporter
0.6
1.6***
(0.6)
(0.5)
EU Frame Treatment*EU
-1.9**
-1.3*
Membership Supporter
(0.8)
(0.8)
Bad Conditions Treatment*EU
Membership Supporter

0.5
(0.8)

-1.1
(0.8)

EU Frame Treatment*Bad
Conditions Treatment

-2.2**
(1)

-1.5
(1)

EU Frame Treatment*Bad
Conditions Treatment* EU
Membership Supporter

1.9*
(1)

1.4
(1)

5.4***
(0.5)

1.9***
(0.4)

Constant

Survey Responses
877
800
2
R
0.033
0.014
Attributions for equal pay: 0(No responsibility for the government) 10(Full responsibility for the government). Attributions for equal
treatment: 0(No responsibility for the government) – 10 (Full
responsibility for the government). Results estimated using OLS
models. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table 3.5: Effects on attributions of responsibility for equal pay
between women and men, by governing regions in Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Federation of
Republika
Bosnia and
Srpska
Herzegovina
EU Frame Treatment
5.3***
1.3*
(1.3)
(0.8)
Bad Conditions Treatment
3.9***
-0.20
(1.2)
(0.7)
EU Membership Supporter
3.2***
1.0
(0.8)
(0.7)
EU Frame Treatment*EU
-4.8***
-2.1*
Membership Supporter
(1.4)
(1.1)
Bad Conditions Treatment*EU
Membership Supporter

-2.3*
(1.3)

-0.07
(1.0)

EU Frame Treatment*Bad Conditions
Treatment

-6.6***
(1.8)

-0.5
(1.0)

EU Frame Treatment*Bad Conditions
Treatment* EU Membership
Supporter

5.8***
(1.9)

1.7
(1.4)

Constant

2.6***
(0.8)

6.1***
(0.5)

Survey Responses
547
330
2
R
0.068
0.022
Attributions for equal pay: 0(No responsibility for the government) 10(Full responsibility for the government). Attributions for equal
treatment: 0(No responsibility for the government) – 10 (Full
responsibility for the government). Results estimated using OLS
models. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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Table 3.6: Structural equation models for the effects of receiving information regarding gender inequality conditions on support
for feminist political parties, feminist activism, and support for EU control of equal pay policy via the responsibility one attributes
to the government for the bad conditions, under the condition of receiving information saying that the EU endorses gender
equality.
Mediating Model
Outcome Models
Effects on gov. Effects on feminist
Effects on
Effects on EU control
attribution
party support
feminist activism
over equal pay
Attribution of Responsibility to the
0.3***
0.3***
0.3***
Government
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.03)
EU Frame Treatment
2.0***
0.1
0.04
0.4
(0.7)
(0.6)
(0.6)
(0.6)
Bad Conditions Treatment
0.7
-0.009
0.3
0.05
(0.7)
(0.7)
(0.6)
(0.6)
EU Membership Supporter
0.6
0.2
0.7
0.9*
(0.6)
(0.5)
(0.5)
(0.5)
EU Frame Treatment*EU Membership
-1.9**
0.05
0.1
-0.4
Supporter
(0.8)
(0.7)
(0.7)
(0.7)
Bad Conditions Treatment*EU Membership
0.48
-0.08
-0.7
-0.6
Supporter
(0.8)
(0.8)
(0.7)
(0.7)
EU Frame Treatment*Bad Conditions
-2.2**
-0.6
-0.4
-0.5
Treatment
(1.0)
(0.9)
(0.8)
(0.8)
EU Frame Treatment *Bad Conditions
1.9*
0.2
0.07
0.01
Treatment* EU Membership Supporter
(1.1)
(1.0)
(0.9)
(0.9)
Constant
5.4***(0.5)
3.7***(0.5)
3.5***(0.5)
2.8***(0.5)
Survey Responses
877
856
850
848
2
R
0.033
0.122
0.149
0.147
Feminist party support: 0(Much less likely to vote for the feminist party) – 10(Much more likely to vote for the feminist party).
Feminist activism: 0(Much less likely to help feminist activist) – 10(Much more likely to help feminist activists). EU control:
0(Much less likely to support EU control over equal pay) – 10(Much more likely to support EU control over equal pay).
Attributions for equal pay: 0(No responsibility for the government) - 10(Full responsibility for the government). Results
estimated using OLS models. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Level of gov. responsibility for equal pay

Expected values of government blame by treatment groups. EU
membership supporters (black) and independence supporters (grey)

Bad conditions
treatment

No conditions
treatment

Bad conditions
treatment

No conditions
treatment

1
0
-1
-2
-3

Difference in level of gov. resp.

2

Difference in government blame for equal pay
(treatment effects of the 'bad conditions' treatment)

Independence supporters

EU membership supporters

Figure 3.1: Responsibility assignment to the government for equal
pay by treatments and EU membership support, with 95% CIs (EU
frame treatment given). Level of goverment responsibility: 0-10
scale. Expected values and differences estimated when
respondents are given an EU framing of equal pay.
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Level of gov. responsibility for equal pay

Expected values of government blame by treatment groups. EU
membership supporters (black) and independence supporters (grey)

Bad conditions
treatment

No conditions
treatment

Bad conditions
treatment

No conditions
treatment

1
0
-1
-2
-3

Difference in level of gov. resp.

2

Difference in government blame for equal pay
(treatment effects of the 'bad conditions' treatment)

Independence supporters

EU membership supporters

Figure 3.2: Responsibility assignment to the government for equal
pay by treatments and EU membership support, with 95% CIs (No
EU frame treatment given). Level of goverment responsibility: 0-10
scale. Expected values and differences estimated when respondents
are NOT given an EU framing of equal pay.
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Diff. in feminist party support
1
-1
0

Effect on feminist party support
(voting for a party that effectively implements equal pay)

Diff. in feminist activist support
-1
0
1

Independence supporters

EU membership supporters

Effect on feminist activism support
(contacting politicians for equal pay activists)

Independence supporters

EU membership supporters

Diff. in EU control support
-1
0
1

Effect on EU control
(giving control of equal pay policies to the EU)

Independence supporters

EU membership supporters

Figure 3.3: Effects from the 'bad conditions' treatment via the
responsibility one assigns to the government for equal pay, with
95% CIs. Support for feminist parties, activists, and EU control:
0-10 scales. Differences estimated when respondents are given an
EU framing of equal pay.
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CHAPTER 4
WHEN DO VOTERS SUPPORT THE EUROPEAN UNION’S
INVOLVEMENT IN GAY RIGHTS? GAY PEOPLE’S HUMAN RIGHTS
IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
The last two chapters dealt with the effect of considering the EU and the
accession process on the opinions of citizens. However, we have not examined opinions
among the groups affected by human rights. In particular, gay people are one of the most
marginalized groups in Bosnia, and they have a high stake in the success of EU policy
standards, which now include policies like equal treatment in the work place.
Commitment to the European Union’s gay rights standards remains weak in countries
applying for EU membership. This lack of commitment presents a puzzle for researchers
and policymakers: if the EU’s gay rights standards have minimal consequences, then
why would anyone want to hand over powers concerning gay rights to the EU? What the
existing research misses is a comparison between those who identify with gay people,
and those who do not. State institutions produce the marginalized status of gay people via
political homophobia, such as national identities defined in opposition to homosexuality.
I expect that those who identify closely with gay people are more supportive of
alternatives to state authority with regards to gay rights. I find that those who identify
more closely with gay people are more likely to vote for parties that want to transfer
control of gay rights to the EU. Since the EU currently lacks effective gay rights
standards, this study establishes an evidence-based imperative for the EU to use its
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capacities to serve gay constituencies directly, such as providing shelters and counselling
for gay people and their families.
4.1 THE LEGITIMCAY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Existing research on political leaders suggests that multiple motivations are
involved in the decision of international and regional organizations to address human
rights. Moravcsik (2000) argues that governments use international organizations to help
entrench human rights principles within their states. Adopting human rights standards in
international organizations make it more costly to renege on agreements later.
Government leaders can more effectively institute legal changes when they act in concert
within international organizations. However, existing research suggests that the
implementation of international and regional human rights principles are often weak and
ineffective around the world (Hathaway 2002; 2007). Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005)
suggest that the adoption of international human rights regimes remains window-dressing
around the world. Pegram (2010) shows that some governments (even in nondemocracies) establish national human rights institutions with no interest of substantially
changing their treatment of marginalized peoples.
The problem of ineffective implementation is found in Europe’s international
institutions (touted to be the strongest). The EU, as well as all other international
organizations involved in rights, rely on their member state governments for
implementation. The EU has wanted to address human rights (especially employment
and work place discrimination) since the mid-20th century. It possesses the European
Court of Justice, arguably the most powerful regional judicial institution. Joining the
European Union involves a rigorous process of adopting human rights principles and
demonstrating to EU officials and the member states that they have been effectively
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addressed with legal and institutional solutions. Countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Turkey undergo the political process of handing over decision-making powers of
important human rights (such as workplace conditions and treatment based on gender and
sexual orientation) to the EU institutions (Commission, Councils, and Parliament). In
practice, however, the EU relies on member state administrations to implement these
principles.
Other scholars examine public support and recognition of human rights
(McFarland and Mathews 2005; Anderson et al. 2002; Davies et al 2012; Ausderan 2014;
Hafner-Burton 2008). A key aspect of human rights policies is that legal change does not
necessarily suggest the normative commitment of a population to rights causes.
Problems with implementation hold true within domestic politics, which may have
minimal international involvement. Hence, the EU’s involvement in human rights means
that its institutions take authority from governments on issues that require civil society
input and participation. The EU has agenda setting power by prescribing rights standards
which applicant governments do not choose, and applicant states joining the EU must
submit to the potential of future EU legislation which changes rights standards. Without
the commitment of the substantial portions of a population, the meaningful
implementation of rights has less of a chance of success.
Public opinion research suggests that a number of factors lead citizens to support
human rights. McFarland and Mathews (2005) show that one’s sense of empathy,
education level, political knowledge associate with support for human rights, while one’s
sense of global identity and moral reasoning improved one’s commitment to the
implementation of human rights principles. Anderson et al (2002) show that knowledge
of government abuses increased one’s recognition that human rights are problematic in
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one’s state. The spread of information about abuses (naming and shaming) reduces the
belief that governments respect human rights (Davies et al 2012; Ausderan 2014), while
it also can have the unintended consequence of antagonizing regimes which may violate
rights even more than before (Hafner-Burton 2008). Shaming from the international
community is shown to increase public recognition of human rights abuses (Ausderan
2014).
While the international community seems to make a difference in terms of
recognition of abuses, civil society is an important component of pressuring governments
to implement meaningful reforms. Important studies in constructivist research shows that
civil society organizations respond to the human rights standards of international
organizations, and apply pressure to the government to comply with their agreements
(Keck and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Civil society is the place where
success and failure of human rights reforms hinge, especially when there are otherwise
uncooperative governments. Falkner et al. (2006; 2008) show that without the
commitment of civil society actors and bureaucratic officials and local politicians “on the
ground”, EU workplace standards are ineffective. Avdeyeva (2010) shows that strong
women’s movements improved that chances for the EU’s women’s rights standards to be
adopted in Eastern European states. Furthermore, Montoya (2013) shows that without
grassroots organizing on behalf of combating domestic violence, the implementation of
the EU’s conventions regarding domestic violence remains weak. The linkage between
international organizations and citizens is shown to be key in the successful reform of
governments, especially in the contexts where the implementation of EU human rights
principles remains problematic. If the status quo is minimal implementation, then
support in the populace may be critical in terms of influencing elected officials.
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What is missing in the public opinion studies is the source of legitimacy for the
authority of international and regional institutions to handle human rights. Individuals
perceive problems in their society, and theoretically some of these problems are
considered appropriate for particular institutions to handle. Why individuals see a
problem as appropriate for the European Union to handle remains an open question.
Governments give up independence when they join EU, which is an important part of the
public debate over EU membership, and this loss of independence affects numerous
policies including human rights. Without understanding the factors that lead individuals
to support giving up their government’s independence in policy-making, politicians and
policy-makers cannot understand the constituencies that seek representation from the
European Union. The EU offers new political institutions to citizens in applicant states,
where their interests could be furthered. Constituencies that believe that the EU could
offer advantages over the independent state institutions also may offer the EU more
legitimacy.
Human rights require substantial contributions from civil society in order for
enforcement to work, and often they do not. This problem presents a puzzle for
researchers and policymakers: what would explain support for giving powers concerning
human rights to the EU? This question is of importance to voters in states applying for
EU membership, because they face the political choice of giving up control of human
rights policies like gay rights to the EU’s standards and institutions (Rettman 2012;
European Parliament 2013). Once a state joins the EU, many human rights policies are
subject to legislation and enforcement measures from EU institutions, as opposed to state
institutions alone. Structural violence against marginalized groups across a society stems
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in part from these state institutions, which commit human rights abuses against
marginalized peoples (Hafner-Burton 2014).
What is more, a growing body of research shows that state authorities repress
sexual minorities in order to further nation-building. Altman (1996; 2004; 2008) argues
that LGBT categorizations of people spread around the world in the later 20th century.
Political homophobia was picked up as a tool by leaders to legitimize their nationbuilding along sexual and gender lines (Bosia and Weiss 2013). For example, during the
civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s, Bosniac Muslim men (perhaps several
thousand – the number of abused men and boys is not clear) were coerced into
homosexual postures and/or sexually abused by Serb forces (Olujic, 1998; Bosia, 2010).
Bosia (2010) argues that this systematic abuse bolstered Serb national identity with
masculinity and patriotism as defining features, in juxtaposition to Bosniacs who were
humiliated and tarnished by sexual norms. Bosia (2010) further argues that same-gender
sexual activity in the context of ‘homosexualized violence’ redefines homosexual people
as threats to national identities and nation-building (see also Bosia and Weiss 2013).
Ostracism and categorization by state institutions produce even stronger identity
claims on the basis of sexual identity (Bosia and Weiss 2013; Marx 1998; Olzak 1983).
Homosexuality as a social category and its corresponding ‘queerness’ are products of
statecraft, which promote subjectively desirable sexual and family behavior on behalf of
national interests (heteronormativity) (Canaday 2009). Feelings of closeness to queer
identities reflect a rejection of dominant social norms reflected in state institutions. I
argue that this feeling of closeness is grounds for support for authorities that represent
alternatives to the state. I expect that the EU is perceived as a legitimate source of
authority on gay rights, because of one’s identification with gay people. It follows that
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people who identify closely with marginalized groups should be more supportive of
giving control of human rights policies to the European Union, which represents an
alternative to the policy agenda of state leaders. Huddy (2001) argues that scholars need
to pay attention to “subjective meaning of identity and its ability to shape groups
members’ political outlook and action” (519). Hence, scholars should recognize the
intensity of one’s identification with marginalized people (see Weldon 2011).
H1: As one more closely identifies with gay people, one is more likely to
support giving control of gay rights to the European Union.
I argue that those who feel close to gay people perceive the EU as a more
legitimate source of authority for gay rights issues, in comparison to those who
disassociate from gay people. Hence, I also should expect that those who feel close to
gay people consider the legitimacy of the EU, when making political choice to support
EU control of gay rights policies. It follows that the effect of trusting EU institutions on
support for EU control is greater among those who feel close to gay people in comparison
to those who disassociate with gay people.
H2: The effect of trust in EU institutions on one’s support for giving the
EU control of gay rights increases as one identifies more closely with gay
people.
Marginalized status also should affect voting behavior towards parties that want
to institute the reforms necessarily to change the abusive context of marginalized groups.
In other words, people support human rights parties, because of their association with
affected groups. This study concerns support for the EU’s control of gay rights but
expectations about voting behavior concerning domestic gay rights policies follow the
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same theoretical social process: gay people’s marginalization leads to support for
alternative authority sources to address their marginalization.
H3: As one more closely identifies with gay people, one is more likely to
vote for parties that want to effectively implement human rights reforms
for gay people.
This “marginalized group effect” should be moderated by satisfaction with the
government, because people who associate with gay people (the primary stakeholders in
gay rights policies, among citizens) should consider their satisfaction with their rulers
more strongly, when they make up their mind about voting for parties that address their
marginalized status. In the domestic context, those who feel close to gay people should
consider satisfaction with government more strongly, because they are more deeply
affected by gay rights policies. Support for rights from state institutions derives from
dissatisfaction with state institutions, which produce the marginalization of affected
groups.
H4: The effect of dissatisfaction with the government on support for
rights-friendly parties positively increases as one identifies more closely
with marginalized groups.
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN
In order to test the hypotheses, I use data from an original survey conducted in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 2015 with a representative sample of one thousand
respondents. The nationally representative sample of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
recruited by Ipsos. The sample includes 1000 adults (18+). The response rate was 67.8
percent. Ipsos uses random iterative weighting (RIM) in order to offset sampling biases
with regards to sex, age, ethnicity, and rural/urban settlements. The results reported here
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hold with and without respect to the recommended weighting. The survey consisted of
face-to-face, computer-assisted interviews. The survey was carried out in Bosnia, which
is a state trying to join the EU. Bosnia is a theoretically appropriate case because its
citizens and leaders face the political choice to submit to the EU’s control over human
rights policies, or not. Moreover, the Bosnia case possesses two governing regions
(Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) which allow me to
replicate the study across two national contexts. Bosnia also is theoretically appropriate
because it is a site of political homophobia, where leaders drew national boundaries via
same-gender sexual violence (Bosia and Weiss 2013). Bosnia is a context where gay
people routinely face homophobia within families, the workplace, and in civil society;
which necessitates research into a constituency which has a high stake in the policy
prescriptions of the EU. Homophobia is acute and reforms relating to combating
discrimination lack normative commitment (ILGA-Europe 2013; Human Rights Watch
2014). Gay pride marches have met violent protests resulting in hurt marchers.
The results from the survey reflect the aforementioned homophobic context. The
translation of “gay” in the survey is “homoseksualnih” which approximates the concept
of homosexual. For instances, 55 percent of respondents do not think it is appropriate to
report job promotions that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, 55 percent of
respondents tend to not see the government as responsible for the treatment of gay
people, 66 percent of respondents said they would be less likely to help lobby for gay
rights if a gay rights activist asked them to help, and 72 percent of respondents exhibit no
feeling of closeness to gay people as a social group (1.5 percent identify as extremely
close to gay people as a group). Opinions about women’s rights provide a point of
comparison, which show the relative unpopularity of gay rights in Bosnia. Thirty-three
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percent of respondents do not think it is appropriate to report job promotions that
discriminate on the basis of gender, 22 percent of respondents tend to not see the
government as responsible for gender inequality in pay, 28 percent of respondents said
they would be less likely to help lobby for women’s rights if a women’s rights activist
asked them to help, and six percent of respondents exhibit no feeling of closeness to
women as a social group (51 percent identify as extremely close to women as a group).
Following the theoretical argument, support for the EU’s control of gay rights
derives from one’s association with gay people. In order to operationalize support for the
EU’s control of gay rights policies, I use the variable in the survey based on the question:
Suppose that you learned that a political party wanted to give control of gay
rights policies to the European Union. How much more likely or unlikely
would you be to vote for that political party? Please indicate your views
using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “Much less
likely”, 5 means “Neither less or more likely”, and 10 means “Much more
likely”.
The modal category for this variable is “0” with 34.5 percent of the respondents, and 88
percent responded “5” or less (34 percent responded as “5” or neither). This results
reflect the low popularity of gay rights (a similar question regarding women’s rights had
54 percent of respondents responding as “5” or less). These responses indicate that the
EU has little legitimacy to control gay rights among Bosnians. However, the EU is
involved in these policies, and EU membership means that governments lose
independence with regards to decision-making for gay rights politics. EU institutions
would take partial control of these policies. Hence, the responses to this item suggest the
level of on-the-ground support that the EU would have in regards to gay rights. The
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result here suggests that support for cooperation is low, which impedes implementation.
Therefore, explaining this support for EU control is important to scholars and policymakers interested in effective gay rights policies.
I replicate the hypothesis testing with women’s rights in order to check whether
one’s feelings of closeness towards gay people associates with EU control of rights
policies, or whether these feelings of closeness associates with EU control of gay rights
policies in particular (which I theorize). In order to replicate this test, I use the variable
in the survey based on the question:
Suppose that you learned that a political party wanted to give control of
equal pay [between women and men] policies to the European Union.
How much more likely or unlikely would you be to vote for that political
party? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to
10, where 0 means “Much less likely”, 5 means “Neither less or more
likely”, and 10 means “Much more likely”.
The modal category for this variable is “5” with 36.7 percent of the respondents, and 53.7
percent of the respondents responded “5” or less (20 percent responded as “10” or much
more likely). The mean for this variable is 6.1, compared to 3.0 for the analogous gay
rights variable above, which further suggests the marginalized status of gay people and
the relative comfort among the population for giving control of women’s rights to the
EU. If the marginalized status of gay people influences support for the EU’s control of
gay rights, I would not expect for this marginalized status to have a similar influence on
support for EU control of women’s rights. The marginalized status of gay people should
compel support for alternative authorities which address that particular marginalized
group.
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The key explanatory variable in this study is one’s identification with gay people.
Support for the EU’s authority regarding gay rights derives from feelings of closeness
with gay people, who experience marginalization from state institutions. Following
Huddy (2001; 2003), I conceptualize identity as structured probabilistically throughout
society, meaning that one’s feelings of closeness to a group varies in intensity from those
who do not feel close to those who feel very close. Hence, I use the variable in the
survey based on the question:
On a scale of 0-10, where 0 represents having no feeling of closeness to the
group in question and 10 represents feeling extremely close to the group in
question, how close do you feel in your ideas, interests and feelings to each
group listed below? [Gay people]
The modal category for this variable is “0” with 72 percent of the respondents, and 95
percent of the respondents responded “5” or less (5 percent responded as “5”, while 1.5
percent responded as “10”). This results shows that only a small percent of the
population identifies closely with homosexuals as a group (compared to women, for
instance, where 51 percent of the respondents identify extremely closely with women as a
group). This measure reflects feelings of closeness as probabilistic across society, and
measures that one’s feelings of closeness to the gay people. Their feelings of closeness
theoretically should confer more legitimacy to the EU which offers an alternative to the
authority of Bosnian state institutions, which marginalize gay people. In the analysis, I
compare those who disassociate with gay people (the preponderance of the population,
“0”), and those who identify extremely closely with gay people (“10”), because they face
the most marginalization and are of the most theoretical and normative concern for this
study.
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Other factors may confound the theoretical links between these variables. The
salience of the treatment of gay people is conceptually distinct from one’s association
with gay people, and this salience may lead citizens to want to give control of gay rights
to the EU, given the abusive situation facing gay people in Bosnia. Hence, I control for
salience based on the question:
For you personally, how important is the debate over the treatment of gay
people? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10,
where “0” means it’s Not important at all and “10” means it’s Very important.
The modal category for this variable is “0” with 46.5 percent of the respondents, and 80.9
percent of the respondents responded “5” or less (7.8 percent responded as “10” or very
important). People who trust EU institutions may be more likely to want to give control
of gay rights policies to the EU, so I include a control variable for EU trust so I can be
more confident that I am estimating a “feeling of closeness with gay people” effect as
opposed to an EU trust effect. Similarly, I introduce a control for left-right ideology (21
point scale) because conservatives are less likely to want to give control of gay rights
policies to the EU, while socialists would be more comfortable with EU control of those
policies. I constructed the ideological measure by taking one’s feeling of closeness with
conservatives (11 point scale) and subtracting that variable from one’s feeling of
closeness with socialists (11 point scale), producing a 21 scale with “-10” representing
those who feel extremely close to conservative but not close at all to socialists and “10”
representing those who feel extremely close to socialists but not close at all to
conservatives. I introduce a control for satisfaction for the government (11 point scale)
because people who are dissatisfied with existing leaders may be more likely to support
alternative authorities irrespective of their marginalized status. Lastly, I control for
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political knowledge (8 point scale) because people with a lot information about politics
should realize that EU has limited reach in changing domestic policies, and the tenuous
ability of the EU to change the tri-party governing system established by the Dayton
Accords (producing inefficient governance) (see Subotić 2009). I constructed the
political knowledge measure with a battery of seven questions regarding the names of
political officeholders in Bosnia, creating a score of “0” through “7” correct answers.
These questions do less to prime the respondents to consider the EU before they answer
questions about the European Union, and the ability to discern one’s political leaders
should highly correlate with one’s ability to consider the authority of the EU. In the
appendix, in order to take the context of the Bosnian state into account, I include a model
(Appendix C, Table 1) which controls for closeness with Bosniacs, Croats, Serbs,
Europeans, and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The results hold with respect to
these control variables.
I present cross-tabulations of the support for EU control of gay rights across the
groups of theoretical interest, along with other important explanatory variables (see Table
1). People who feel close to gay people are more likely to support the EU’s control of
gay rights policies. People who feel close to gay people are more likely to trust EU
institutions as well. People who feel close to gay people are more likely to be to be more
on the left than those who do not. People who feel close to gay people and those who do
not have indistinguishable levels of political knowledge. These means are suggestive,
and suggest that those who feel close to gay people may be a constituency that is more in
favor of EU powers concerning rights. However, I need to estimate the effect of
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closeness to gay people on support for EU control with respect to trust for EU
institutions, ideology, and political knowledge.
In order to further test the argument that marginalization from the state
influences the political behavior of those identifying with gay people, I examine support
for political parties that support gay rights. Hence, I use the variable in the survey based
on the question:
Suppose that you learned that a political party wanted to train and pay
enough labor inspectors to ensure that gay people would never be fired
due to their sexual identity. How much more likely or unlikely would you
be to vote for that political party? Please indicate your views using any
number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “Much less likely”, 5
means “Neither less or more likely”, and 10 means “Much more likely”.
The modal category for this variable is “0” with 40.6 percent of the respondents, and 91
percent of the respondents responded “5” or less (32 percent responded as “5” or neither).
This variable allows me to gauge willingness to support a political party that wants to
addresses gay rights effectively. I expect that those identifying with gay people will be
more likely to support these parties. I further expect that those identifying with gay
people will more strongly consider their satisfaction with the government when they
make up their minds to support these parties.
Hence, I use the variable in the survey based on the question:
How satisfied are you with the current state government’s performance?
Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where
“0” means Very satisfied and “10” means Very dissatisfied.
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The modal category for this variable is “10” with 52.8 percent of the respondents, and
76.4 percent of the respondents responded “5” or more (11 percent responded as “5”).
The high level of dissatisfaction reflects discontent with the governing system, which has
difficulty passing policies (partially due to inter-ethnic rivalries) and addressing the
public’s concerns, such as corruption and unemployment. This variable allows me to
gauge satisfaction with the government, and observe whether this variable has stronger
effect on support for gay-friendly parties among those who associate with gay people.
I replicate the hypothesis testing with women’s rights in order to check whether
one’s feelings of closeness towards gay people associates with rights-friendly parties in
general, or whether these feelings of closeness associates with gay rights-friendly parties
in particular (which I theorize). In order to replicate this test, I use the variable in the
survey based on the question:
Suppose that you learned that a political party wanted to train and pay
enough labor inspectors to ensure that women and men received equal pay
throughout society. How much more likely or unlikely would you be to
vote for that political party? Please indicate your views using any number
on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “Much less likely”, 5 means
“Neither less or more likely”, and 10 means “Much more likely”.
The modal category for this variable is “5” with 32 percent of the respondents, and 77
percent of the respondents responded “5” or more (8 percent responded as “0” or much
less likely). The mean for this variable is 6.0, compared to 2.8 for the analogous gay
rights variable above, which further suggests the marginalized status of gay people and
the relative comfort among the Bosnian population with women’s rights. If the
marginalized status of gay people influences support for gay rights-friendly parties, I
98

would not expect for this marginalized status to have a similar influence on support for
women’s rights-friendly parties. The marginalized status of gay people should compel
support for authorities which address that particular marginalized group.
To test the hypotheses, I estimate statistical models which allow me to compare
levels of support for EU control over gay rights across people’s feelings of closeness (or
not) with gay people, with respect to important control variables. I treat the 11 point
dependent variable as continuous, and I estimate OLS models. The modal category of
the dependent variable is “0” (Much less likely to support a party that wants to give
control of gay rights policies to the EU), so the survey item may censor the responses
where the respondents may have been more adamantly opposed to EU control than the
survey item allowed for (‘left censored’ data). Hence, I also estimated tobit models that
take this censorship into account. For the following models that I report, the substantive
effects remain the same across the OLS and tobit models (I included the tobit models in
the appendix). In order to replicate the test, I substituted the dependent variable
concerning EU control of gay rights with EU control of women’s rights (equal pay for
equal work between men and women), and the results suggest that feelings of closeness
with gay people does not associate with support for EU control of equal pay. This result
indicates that feeling close to gay people has a more specific effect on considerations of
gay rights policies. I also checked if the result held across the two governing regions of
Bosnia (the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), and the
same results held. Hence, the findings operate in a cross-national context (Serb
politicians control the RS, while a coalition of Bosniak and Croat politicians control the
FBiH).
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4.3 RESULTS
Table 2 presents the results of the OLS models, with the main dependent variable
along with other robustness checks. In the model in the middle of the table, I did not
include the controls. The coefficient for EU control of gay rights is positive and
statistically significant across the models, which suggests that associating with gay
people increases the likelihood of voting for parties that want to give control of gay rights
to the EU. In Figure 1, I graph the level of support for EU control of gay rights across
the different levels of association with gay people. The two groups of theoretical
importance are those who have no feelings of closeness (“0”, those who have
disassociated with gay people) and those with extreme feelings of closeness (“10”, those
with the strongest connection to the marginalized group in question). One’s likelihood of
voting for a party that wants to give the EU control of gay rights is substantially higher
among those who closely associate with gay people in comparison to those who do not
feel close; suggestive evidence for hypothesis one.
Moving to the control variables, those who trust EU institutions are also more
likely to vote for parties who want to give control of gay rights policies to the EU.
People on the political left are more likely to want to transfer control of gay rights as
well. Government satisfaction did not have a significant effect on support for EU control.
Meanwhile, those with higher levels of political knowledge are less likely to support
giving the EU control of gay rights, which suggests their knowledge of the EU’s limited
capacity in terms of gay rights.
Moving to the models from the governing regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
association with gay people leads to further support for EU control of gay rights policies
for both the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given the
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cross-national context of Bosnia, this result suggests that this phenomenon holds in
different types of political systems with different sets of leaders from the ethnicities
comprising the state.
I argue that those who feel close to gay people perceive the EU as a more
legitimate source of authority on gay rights. Hence, considerations of the EU’s
legitimacy should weigh more heavily in the decision-making of those feeling close to
gay people, when they make up their minds about the EU’s control of gay rights. Hence,
I estimated statistical models that include an interaction term for closeness to gay people
and trust in the EU (in Table 2). In the model with the interactions, the variable Feeling
close to gay people is positive and statistically significant, which indicates that among
those who do not trust the EU (“0” on the eleven point scale), one’s association with gay
people increases the likelihood of voting for parties that want to give the EU control of
gay rights policies. The variable Trust in the EU is negative and statistically
insignificant, meaning that Trust in the EU does not have a substantive effect on support
for giving control to the EU among those who disassociate with gay people. The
interaction term Feeling close to gay people*Trust in the EU is positive and statistically
insignificant, indicating that the effect of Trust in the EU on support giving the EU
control does not substantively increase as one increases one’s association with gay
people. Hence, I did not find supportive evidence for hypothesis two. In order to further
examine whether gay people consider the EU a legitimate authority when it comes to gay
rights, I replicate the statistical models with another dependent variable of theoretical
importance.
In Table 2, I replicate the models using support for EU control of women’s rights
as the dependent variable (far right of the table). Neither feeling close to gay people nor
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thinking the equal treatment of gay people is personally important associates with support
for the EU’s control of women’s rights. Those who trust the EU and those on the
political left were more likely to support EU control of women’s rights. These results
suggest that association with gay people has a specific effect on support for EU control of
gay rights policies.
4.4 A FURTHER TEST OF THE ARGUMENT
I argue that those associating with gay people support the EU’s control, because
of marginalization by state institutions. Hence, this mechanism should influence political
behavior regarding domestic institutions as well as international institutions. Citizens not
only face support for giving more authority to the EU, but also support for political
parties that offer more support for gay rights causes. Those identifying with gay people
should support parties that are more gay-rights friendly. Their support also should be
moderated by satisfaction with the government. If state institutions marginalize gay
people, then satisfaction with the government should be a stronger consideration among
those associating with gay people in comparison to those who do not associate with gay
people (if the stance towards gay people is the source of satisfaction/dissatisfaction),
when they make up their minds about gay rights-friendly parties. This suggests that
support for more gay-friendly leaders is derived to some extent from dissatisfaction with
the government among those who feel close to gay people.
Table 3 presents the results of the OLS models, with the main dependent variable
being one’s likelihood of voting for parties that friendly towards gay rights. Feelings of
closeness to gay people associate with more support for gay-rights friendly parties as
expected; suggestive evidence in favor of hypothesis 3. Satisfaction with the government
alone does not have an effect on support for gay-friendly parties. In order to replicate the
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findings, I replaced the dependent variable concerning gay-friendly parties, and I
replaced it with a variable concerning women’s rights-friendly parties, and neither
closeness with gay people or the importance one feels about the treatment of gay people
associated with that dependent variable. The R2 value was 0.03 for the women’s rights
model, and 0.11 for the gay rights model, suggesting that gay rights model better fits
these data in comparison to women’s rights model. Moving to the model interaction
term, Feeling close to gay people is positive and statistically significant, which indicates
that feelings of closeness to gay people is positive among those who are satisfied with the
government. The interaction term Feeling close to gay people*Dissatisfaction with the
government is positive and statistically significant, which indicates the effect of
dissatisfaction with the government on support for gay-rights friendly parties increases as
one associates more closely with gay people; suggestive evidence for hypothesis four.
This result suggests that satisfaction with the government is more of a consideration for
those feeling close to gay people when they choosing to support a party that wants to
address the treatment of gay people.
4.5 CONCLUSIONS
Under what conditions do voters support giving the EU control of gay rights? I
show that those who feel close to gay people are more likely to support giving the EU
more control, in comparison to those who do not feel close. Feelings of closeness with
gay people also affected considerations of domestic politics. Those who felt close were
more likely to vote for parties that address gay rights, and this effect on votes for gayfriendly parties was conditioned by one’s satisfaction with the government (which
theoretically is an important consideration for marginalized people when choosing
whether to vote for parties that address their marginalized status). Moreover, people’s
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concern about the treatment of gay people associated with one’s support for giving the
EU control of gay rights.
This study moves research on human rights forward by showing the conditions
that connect citizens to the authority of the European Union regarding human rights. The
results suggests that the European Union may have a base of support rooted in the people
affected by gay rights policies, in comparison to those who disassociate from affected
groups. The survey results show that gay rights are unpopular, relative to women’s rights,
providing further evidence for the heteronormativity and homophobia present in Bosnian
society. People marginalized by homophobia in Bosnian society are more likely to lend
support for the EU’s authority, in comparison to those who do not associate with
marginalized people. The findings hold across the governing regions of Bosnia, showing
that the theoretical phenomena occur in cross-national contexts. The literature often
addresses human rights policies in term of an elite process, but it is important for EU
policy-makers to consider those most affected by the policies because they support their
powers concerning gay rights.
This study extends the existing research by showing how international
organizations serve as an alternative source of authority, which minorities support. This
study contributes by showing the pathway through which the “boomerang effect” may
work in the domestic context (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Those who feel close to gay
people are more likely to support political parties that want to give up control to the EU,
in the face of state institutions which reinforce marginalized statuses (heteronormativity).
The results in this study offer further evidence in favor of this posit by showing that
satisfaction with the government affects gay people in theoretically expected ways when
they consider their support for rights friendly parties. The effect of dissatisfaction with
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the government is stronger among those who associate with gay people in comparison to
those who do not associate with gay people. Future studies should examine how
marginalized people respond to political messages from the EU and compare these
responses to the same message delivered by the national government. Is the EU a more
trusted informational source, in comparison to state institutions, among those who feel
close to gay people?
The findings back up normative concerns in the research about the abuses
emanating from state institutions, which lead discriminated groups to support alternative
sources of authority. Paradoxically, state institutions themselves may be in most need of
reform, and increased support for international organizations may be an ineffective
solution in terms of implementing policies. Future research should examine how
marginalized groups reconcile their marginalization with the policies of state institutions,
and recognize the authority of international organizations. How do gay people relate
their experiences of discrimination with the structure of authority in which they live?
Interviews that collect data on personal experiences of discrimination and could move the
research forward, uncovering these connections.
Overall, this study underscores normative concerns in terms of the commitment of the
EU (and other international organizations) to marginalized people. Those who associate
with gay people desire EU governance for their rights (more so than the general
population), even though the EU’s powers are nascent and arguably weak. EU officials
may not be able to force states to adequately implement anti-discrimination policies,
because of the weak normative commitment of the state leaders. Hence, in the absence of
cooperative state leaders, the EU should seek out, fund, and work alongside advocates for
gay people. EU officials should help provide counseling and shelters for those facing
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discrimination and their families, work to protect gay pride marchers, and protect public
gatherings of gay people (see Cochran et al 2002; Van Leeuwen et al. 2006). If those
associating with gay people look to the EU for governance, the EU needs to do more to
help gay people directly, while state institutions continue to sustain discrimination and
fail to act.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of the variables of interest, by
variables one’s feeling of closeness with gay people. Means of the
variables of interest. 95 percent confidence intervals in brackets.
Number of observations in parentheses.
Feeling close to gay people Not feeling close
to gay people
Giving the EU
4.56 [3.79-5.33]
2.81 [2.62-3.00]
control of gay
(59)
(779)
rights
Giving the EU
control of
women’s rights

6.74 [6.17-7.30]
(76)

6.00 [5.80-6.20]
(823)

Equal treatment
for gay people is
important

5.40 [4.45-6.35]
(62)

2.38 [2.16-2.60]
(776)

Trust in EU
institutions

6.37 [5.76-6.99]
(78)

5.42 [5.20-5.63]
(851)

Dissatisfaction
with the
government

7.83 [7.16-8.51]
(78)

7.92 [7.74-8.11]
(858)

Ideology (RightLeft)

1.80 [0.90-2.70]
(61)

0.64 [0.41-0.86]
(743)

Political
knowledge

3.51 [3.14-3.88]
(82)

3.54 [3.43-3.66]
(867)

Feeling close to gay people: no feelings of closeness (0) – feeling
extremely close (10). “Feeling close to gay people” represents values
above 5 on the scale. “Not feeling close to gay people” represents
values below 5 on the scale. Giving the EU control of gay rights: 0
(Much less likely to vote for pro-EU control party) – 10 (Much more
likely to vote for pro-EU control party). Giving the EU control of
women’s rights: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-EU control party)
– 10 (Much more likely to vote for pro-EU control
party).Dissatisfaction with the government: 0 (Very satisfied) – 10
(Very dissatisfied). Ideology: -10 (Very conservative) – 10 (Very
socialist). Trust in the EU: 0 (Don’t trust at all) – 10 (Yes, definitely
trust). Political knowledge: 0 political questions correct – 7 political
questions correct. Data source: survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina
2015.
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Table 4.2: Effects on one’s likelihood to vote for a party that wants to give control of rights to the EU.
Effects on gay rights
Effects on
FBiH
RS
women’s rights
Feeling close to gay people
0.3***
0.2***
0.2**
0.2**
0.2*
-0.009
(0.05)
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.07)
(0.09)
(0.06)
Trust in the EU
0.02
-0.04
0.02
0.05
0.10***
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.04)
Feeling close to gay people*Trust in the
0.007
EU
(0.005)
Ideology (Right-Left)
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.06*
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.03)
Dissatisfaction with the government
-0.004
-0.007
0.03
-0.02
0.03
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.03)
Political knowledge
-0.07
-0.08
-0.08
0.03
-0.05
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.07)
(0.1)
(0.06)
The treatment of gay people is important
0.2***
0.2***
0.2***
0.2***
0.006
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.04)
Constant
2.6***
2.4***
2.4***
2.0***
2.3***
5.3***
(0.1)
(0.4)
(0.4)
(0.5)
(0.6)
(0.4)
Survey responses
872
732
729
438
294
742
R2
0.05
0.13
0.13
0.12
0.15
0.02
Dependent variable for the gay rights models: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-EU control party) – 10 (Much more likely to vote for
pro-EU control party). Dependent variable of the women’s rights model: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-EU control party) – 10
(Much more likely to vote for pro-EU control party). Feeling close to gay people: 0 (No feelings of closeness – 10 (Feeling extremely
close). Dissatisfaction with the government: 0 (Very satisfied) – 10 (Very dissatisfied). Ideology: -10 (Very conservative) – 10 (Very
socialist). Trust in the EU: 0 (Don’t trust at all) – 10 (Yes, definitely trust). Political knowledge: 0 political questions correct – 7
political questions correct. Importance of the treatment of gay people: 0 (Not important at all) – 10 (Very important). FBiH and RS
models represents respondents in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, respectively. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Results estimated using OLS models. Data source: July 2015 survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.3: Effects on one’s likelihood to vote for a party that wants to address rights effectively.
Effects on gay rights
Effects on
FBiH
RS
women’s rights
Feeling close to gay people
0.3***
0.2***
0.2***
0.1*
0.3***
0.003
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.06)
Dissatisfaction with the government
0.03
-0.05
0.08*
-0.03
0.2***
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.04)
Feeling close to gay
0.01***
people*Dissatisfaction with gov.
(0.004)
Ideology (Right-Left)
0.08**
0.06*
0.06
0.09*
0.04
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.04)
Trust in the EU
0.02
0.02
0.009
0.02
0.07*
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.04)
Political knowledge
-0.06
-0.08
-0.09
0.01
0.009
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.07)
(0.1)
(0.07)
The treatment of gay people is
0.2***
0.2***
0.2***
0.2***
0.0182
important
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.04)
Constant
2.4***
1.8***
1.9***
1.7***
1.9***
4.2***
(0.1)
(0.3)
(0.3)
(0.5)
(0.6)
(0.5)
Survey responses
877
731
728
435
296
744
R2
0.05
0.11
0.12
0.09
0.19
0.03
Dependent variable for the gay rights models: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-gay rights party) – 10 (Much more likely to vote for
pro-women’s rights party). Dependent variable of the women’s rights model: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-EU control party) –
10 (Much more likely to vote for pro-EU control party).Feeling close to gay people: 0 (No feelings of closeness – 10 (Feeling
extremely close). Dissatisfaction with the government: 0 (Very satisfied) – 10 (Very dissatisfied). Ideology: -10 (Very conservative) –
10 (Very socialist). Trust in the EU: 0 (Don’t trust at all) – 10 (Yes, definitely trust). Political knowledge: 0 political questions correct
– 7 political questions correct. Importance of the treatment of gay people: 0 (Not important at all) – 10 (Very important). FBiH and
RS models represents respondents in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, respectively. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Results estimated using OLS models. Data source: July 2015 survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Expected value of one's likelihood to vote
2
4
6
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0
2
4
6
8
10
No close feelings (0) - extremely close feelings (10) with gay people
Figure 4.1: The effect of feeling close to gay people on one's likelihood to vote for a party
that supports giving the EU control of gay rights, with 95% CIs. Dependent variable: 0
(Much less likely to vote for pro-EU control party) – 10 (Much more likely to vote for proEU control party). Data source: July 2015 survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
The European Union has taken up anti-discrimination policies with the goal of
addressing Europe-wide problems of marginalization and abuse with a more Europe-wide
solution. In doing so, the EU sets up standards for its members and countries that are
applying for membership. The standards for membership established for applicant
countries bring potential political conflict with them, which is especially consequential
for marginalized people like women and gay people. This political conflict has been
central to the dissertation, and is reflected in the previous chapters. This concluding
chapter reviews the findings, the methods, and the implications of this study for policymakers and further research.
The findings suggest that the EU entices politicians and the populace with
membership (albeit weakly), which is often perceived as providing economic benefits.
While the EU intervenes in domestic politics on issues that affect people’s day-to-day
lives, the EU leverages this desire for membership in applicant states by telling to
governments to reform, which entails issues like anti-discrimination that can collide with
people’s personal values. Furthermore, EU membership can confront citizens’
preferences regarding their state’s independence and sovereignty. The EU’s goal to have
the “community values/rules” of its members promoted among states who aspire to join.
However, until this dissertation, we have not tried to understand what happens when the
EU’s goals encounter people who disagree with the EU’s values and disagree with EU
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membership. We also have not assessed why the groups affected (marginalized people)
want to support the greater control of the EU. Marginalized people arguably have the
greatest stakes in these policies.
These findings were gleaned from research designs that employed survey
experiments. Through the work of Ipsos, I collected a representative sample of citizens
for interviews and randomly assigning the citizens to groups, which receive different
information in the interviews. For the first survey experiment, I manipulated whether 1)
the respondents heard that adopting women’s rights advanced EU membership, and 2) the
respondents heard that membership was certain or whether requirements must be met to
attain membership. I examined the effects of the manipulations among those who
perceive benefits from the EU, and among those who support women’s rights. For the
second survey experiment, I manipulated whether 1) respondents heard that adopting
women’s rights and gay rights advanced EU membership, and 2) the respondents heard
that conditions in terms of women’s rights and gay rights were particularly bad in Bosnia
compared to the rest of Europe. I examined the effects of the manipulations among those
who support or oppose EU membership. The fair characterization of this approach is the
collection of ‘snapshots’ of public opinion. My surveys suggest that EU messages have
anticipated effects across both of the surveys (although not consistently). Hence, followup studies should collect more data over time in order to evaluate whether the EU’s
involvement in rights policies has a lasting effect on public opinion.
This project is particularly important for women and LGBT people (groups which
know no national borders), many of whom must live in contexts where they are
surrounded by people who are hostile towards rights and privileges connected to their
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group-status. To ignore the reactions of those who oppose rights, or oppose institutions
like the EU that protect rights, may endanger the very members of society who are meant
to be protected. For instance, the findings show that when state independence supporters
are told that equal pay is a condition for EU membership, and that gender inequality
conditions are bad in their country, they are more likely to absolve their government of
blame for unequal pay and reduce their support for feminist causes (like helping women’s
rights activists by contacting politicians, and reporting discriminatory job promotions).
The findings also show that making citizens feel like have to “jump through hoops” in
order to get into EU can negative affect opinions about the EU’s rights standards. On the
other hand, gender equality opponents who see the EU as economic beneficial feel more
supportive of equal pay when they believe that EU membership is certain. LGBT rights
recently have been incorporated into the EU’s agenda in applicant states. In terms of
newer standards that the EU is promoting, support for greater EU control is partially
derived from one’s feelings of closeness with gay people.
The chapters in this volume center on Bosnian citizens’ reactions to the EU’s
involvement in its domestic politics. By underscoring ways that the EU can elicit support
and opposition to their anti-discrimination agenda, the chapters show that the EU is not
“too distant” to affect citizens’ attitudes. The EU, its opponents, and marginalized people
have a stake in understanding citizen responses to standards for membership, which
under certain conditions may undermine or bolster their objectives. In the rest of this
concluding essay, I explore the interplay between the findings in this study, policy
solutions geared at combating discrimination, and future research which could advance
our understanding of citizen responses to EU policy-making.
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In the EU and applicant states, there are two contradictory forces affecting the
prospects for combating discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual orientation. On
the one hand, there is political momentum for more EU instruments to address
discrimination. The applicant states have set up gender equality agencies which seek to
find and report on case of discrimination, and provide support for local authorities. New
government agencies also collaborate with civil society groups, and participate in
awareness-raising through public meetings which sometimes include EU officials.
Moreover, applicant states have drawn from women’s groups in civil society in order to
people the agencies.
This increased capacity has accompanied a greater array of rights issues which the
EU has taken up. For instance, in the past few years, gay rights have become salient in
European institutions, and the European Commission has asked all applicant states to
adopt gay rights as criteria for EU membership. Issues like human trafficking have
grown in salience as well. However, this greater capacity and wider array of issues has
not been met with a commiserate level of commitment from political leaders in applicant
states. Agencies are understaffed and have limited authority, and a wide array of issues
does not mean that they are seriously addressed. Overall, the EU has spread around
information about guaranteed rights without the investments necessary to make them real.
Hence, this study, which seeks to understand public reactions to the standards, is critical.
If the public responds negatively with regards to the EU’s goals, then marginalized
people could be endangered even more than before the EU’s intervention.
On the other hand, the growth of Eurosceptisim is spreading and deepening, and
may lead to more opposition to the EU and its policy agenda. Over the years, the EU’s
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popularity has decreased, and the EU’s governance has had a more polarizing effect on
European politics. For instance, in the 2014 European Parliament, a wave of Eurosceptic
politicians was elected who are generally opposed to the power of the EU political
system. In the applicant states as well, sizable swaths of the population do not support
membership, and the EU’s and applicant government’s approaches to accession
(railroading the country towards membership, whether or not membership seems likely)
may be unappealing to those supportive of their state’s independence. This antipathy
from supporters of independence may be dangerous for marginalized groups which have
a stake in the EU’s policies.
The technique of making applicant states pass legislation may have counterproductive effects as well. Binding legislation with regards to equal pay for women and
men, and equal treatment in the workplace, may have produced mixed developments in
EU enlargement. First, the applicant governments have often treated these issues
symbolically: noting them as progress towards EU standards, without enforcing them.
This means that applicant states have established laws with important implications for
people’s day to day lives, but have made them window-dressing. Important issues are
brought to fore politically in the minds of politicians and the populace without much of a
chance for meaningful implementation. This window-dressing debate/laws causes
political problems for marginalized people’s and the advocates who must face a more
political charged environment thanks to the EU’s intervention while they do not have
credible support in the government. The EU’s top down approach also does not involve
all of the relevant actors like civil society groups, which may be able to better tailor
policy standards to fit their societal contexts. Second, once the EU has elevated the
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discussion of rights and effectively made the governments pass laws, objections may be
riled up in the populace. People who disagree with the EU’s values may resent the
feeling that rights issues are imposed. People who do not want to be part of the EU may
resent the issues more than otherwise since their advancement leads their country to EU
membership. The findings suggest that these phenomena can be primed within the
context of survey experiments, which sets the stage for further studies which can
elaborate upon the lasting impact of the EU’s involvement in these issue areas. Data
collected over time can help substantiate this or not.
Several policy implications can be extrapolated from the findings in this study. I
split the implications into three areas: how the EU should change its messaging in
applicant countries, how the EU should partner with national governments when
administering their programs, and how civil society groups should partner with the EU.
First, this study most directly connects the EU’s messaging and communication in the
applicant states. The EU received criticism after the 2004 enlargement (the Central and
Eastern European countries, Cyprus, and Malta) for not involving all of the relevant
actors in the negotiations with the applicant governments. NGOs and civil society groups
were excluded. Critics noted the failure in implementation of the EU’s policies. Hence,
the European Commission established civil society dialogues where EU officials,
government officials, and civil society activists could get together and exchange their
perspectives. The EU’s stated goal is including as much of the public as possible.
However, as mentioned above, the EU’s endeavor in policy-making has largely been
legislative and the implementation of human rights standards has been problematic.
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Hence, the EU is actively involved in awareness raising about reforms that have so far
been limited in scope.
The findings here suggest that there are particular consequences for the EU’s
messaging as well as the connection between setting standards for membership and
important human rights issues. The “carrot on the stick” did not work. The idea of
enforcing reforms does not resonate well with those who are opposed to rights issues or
EU membership. Following research on economic sanctions, punitive measures can
enforce compliance but they also can foster resentment especially if the sources of
authority imposing sanctions are perceived to the illegitimate. The EU’s status as an
external authority arguably exacerbates this phenomenon in the applicant states. Not
only is the EU being punitive but it can be perceived as illegitimate (Duch and Stevenson
2010).
Interestingly, the results in the study suggest that showing a clear path to
membership yields a positive effect in opinions among opponents of gender equality who
see economic benefits from the EU. Hence, the EU’s enticements can move opinions in
the direction the EU wants, but only when the barriers to membership are removed
(perceptually). When the rewards are clear, opinions move positively. Hence, optimism
about membership should be more so discussed among politicians when they address EU
membership with the public. Making EU membership seem inevitable could boost the
changes for positive opinion movement. A future study can unpack whether the effect of
rewards can boost the legitimacy of the EU. Of course, this type of messaging would be
a mixed bag because Eurosceptics respond negatively to issues being addressed as EU
conditions, or EU issues. It could be the case that Eurosceptic politicians could use the
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EU label to get their adherents to double-down against the EU and EU issues, when the
EU ties rights to membership.
Secondly, the findings point to the ways in which the EU should administer
program. The findings and the implications discussed above also speak to changes in how
the EU and applicant governments should involve civil society groups, and carry their
implementation of rights laws. The biggest take away with regards to these relationships
is the chapter on gay rights and those who feel close to gay people. Gay people represent
a highly marginalized group in applicant states like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and
Turkey. The findings here suggest that the EU may not move opinions on gay rights, but
I argue that the EU has an obligation to these groups. Those who feel close to gay people
are more likely to support the EU’s control of gay rights policies, even when controlling
for important variables like support for the EU. If the EU is intervening, and not making
much progress with national politicians (in terms of their support for rights), they should
provide more goods and services to marginalized people themselves. Overall, the general
population does not want the EU to have control and gay people are more or less willing
to give the EU a shot at governance over these issues. Theoretically, systematic
discrimination has led to a higher level of support for governance from an alternative
authority source, among those who feel close to gay people. Hence, the EU should
become directly involved in programs that can provide resources, information, and
shelter for gay people. This assistant to gay people also is justified, because of the
difficulty in instituting gay rights without broad popular support.
In socially conservative countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, adopting gay
rights arguably goes an extra step conceptually in comparison to many women’s rights
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such as equal pay for equal work. For equal pay for equal work, equal pay becomes
attached to one’s personhood as a woman when it is guaranteed is a right. On the other
hand, gay rights ask for a transformed conceptualization of personhood along erotic lines,
which can lead to objections in comparison to other rights. From this new
conceptualization of personhood, equal treatment in the workplace can be attached.
According to Judith Butler, discourses in gay rights intervene in the social process in
which personhood (being human) is articulated. This challenging situation for gay rights
means that their discourses can be a source of backlash which is perhaps revealed in the
very low support for gay rights shown in the study here.
Other pitfalls can be encountered by policy-makers and advocates when
attempting to institute gay rights. Officials promoting gay rights internationally have
often deployed rhetoric termed “homoprotectionism” by Keating (2014), where the state
is the vehicle for anti-homophobic social transformation. As Hillary Clinton suggested in
2011, “progress comes from changes in law… Laws change, then people will” (Clinton
in Keating 2013, 247). Politically, homoprotectionism works to help garner support from
those who hope to put the state more deeply in service of reforms. In other words, they
help attract center-left/socialist voters. However, this motivation and its agenda in terms
of rights’ promotion may have counterintuitive effects. Homoprotectionist discourses,
especially coming from the US and the EU are deeply linked to and embedded in
inequitable global relations of power; thereby tying homosexual people to the agendas of
the EU and US which many view as imperialistic. This political process of linking,
embedding, and tying is strongly represented in the EU accession process where the EU
tells applicant countries what it means to be an EU member in terms of rights support.
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Applicant states theoretically experience a stronger sense of intervention from an external
institution than any other case around the world. The homoprotectionism of the EU may
have helped gay people achieve some changes in policy, but the “high cost of acquiescing
to unjust power relations within and between states” may make the job of advocates
(trying to persuade the public and politicians to change) even more difficult than it would
be otherwise (Bosia and Weiss 2013).
Thirdly, the findings suggest how the EU should further reach out to civil society
groups in the EU accession process. In place of the “hard” legal measures which may
antagonize opponents of human rights and the EU, the EU could promote more soft law
frameworks that allow for civil society input and tailoring to localized situations. A
problem for the EU in general is that framing a rigid legal measure is difficult because
understandings of violence and discrimination are “culturalized” where many Europeans
perceive practices such as the ostracizing of gay people and honor killings as abnormal
parts of European society. The aforementioned friction between “European” norms and
domestic practices could be counter- productive. Hence, local officials and activists can
help frame human rights as by and for the people involved in a particular community, and
not frame as a policy that is being imposed by an external power. This soft law approach
may be especially important for LGBT rights because the international recognition of
same-sex sexualities and gender diversity across cultures is leading to friction between
the “gay/LGBT” politics of the EU and US and the “local/traditional” values in
communities where these rights are being imported, despite longstanding same-sex
loving practices that are present around the world. Overall, this study underscores
normative concerns in terms of the commitment of the EU (and other international
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organizations) to marginalized people. Those who feel close to gay people desire more
EU governance for their rights, in comparison to those who do not feel close. This
association is found even though the EU’s powers are weak, and EU officials are not able
to make states effectively implement anti-discrimination policies that would help gay
people. Therefore, laws are passed without much effect, and political tensions are
escalated without much gain for gay people in terms of enforced rights. I recommend
that the EU do more to help gay communities directly by helping to provide counseling
and shelters for those facing discrimination and their families, work to protect gay pride
marchers, and protect public gatherings of LGBT people.
In order to extend my dissertation project, I plan to further explore opinions about
gay rights. The survey experiments in my dissertation suggest that the EU’s endorsement
did not move opinions about the equal treatment of gay people. One possible explanation
is that survey questions regarding gay people elicit people’s sexual mores, which may not
be easily moved by political messages, in comparison to questions regarding gender and
pay inequalities. Scholars have not measured the reactions of people with different
sexual mores (here, one’s comfort with publically discussing same-sex attraction and
intimacy) to the rights policies, such as equal treatment in the workplace and same-sex
marriage. This posit necessitates an experimental design where respondents hear
vignettes addressing gay rights in either sexual or non-sexual terms (freedom for samegender intimacy, or freedom for gay people, for instances). Then the survey would gauge
opinions about gay rights, the dependent variable. I expect that people who prefer to not
publically discuss same-sex attraction will be more strongly influenced to support gay
rights if this issue is addressed in non-sexual terms. This study will be useful for both the
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growing body of LGBT politics research and LGBT advocacy groups trying to reach out
to communities with conservative mores, and promote acceptance of homosexuality. I
plan to include these items in my next set of surveys in the United Kingdom. With the
help of my stipend, I will collect the data for this project by December 2016. I will
present my research to colleagues and students in the spring of 2017, and I will submit
the resulting manuscript to a journal by May 2017.
In order to further extend my research agenda, I plan to examine the effect of
politicians’ endorsements on support for gay rights. According Michael Bosia and
Meredith Weiss, scholars often omit how political homophobia is a tool for nationbuilding, which establishes national identity in contrast to queer identities (examples
include Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Uganda). What the existing research misses is a
comparison of opinions among the stakeholders in gay rights: people who associate with
marginalized peoples affected by human rights policies, gay people in this study. Human
rights abuses stem centrally from state institutions, which marginalize people within
populations. In particular, state institutions produce the marginalized status of gay people
via political homophobia (for instances, national identities defined in opposition to
homosexuality, and laws which privilege heterosexual relationships). Hence, I expect
that those who identify more closely with gay people are more supportive of alternatives
to state authority with regards to gay rights. The analysis will be based on an original
survey experiment of Turkey, an applicant for EU membership. When survey
respondents are told that EU officials endorse gay rights, I expect that those identifying
with gay people assign more responsibility to the government for addressing gay rights,
in comparison to respondents told that national officials endorse gay rights. This study
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contributes to EU public opinion research by showing whether marginalized people, who
have a stake in the EU’s rights policies, provide a constituency that trusts EU leadership.
I hope to collect the data for this project by December 2017. I will present my research
to colleagues and students in the spring of 2018, and I will submit the manuscript to a
journal by May 2018.
My proposed research underscores normative concerns in terms of the
commitment of the EU (and other international organizations) to marginalized people.
EU officials may not be able to force states to adequately implement anti-discrimination
policies, so they should seek out, fund, and work alongside advocates for LGBT people.
Hence, EU officials should help provide counseling and shelters for those facing
discrimination and their families, work to protect gay pride marchers, and protect public
gatherings of LGBT people. The EU needs to do more to help LGBT people directly,
while state institutions continue to sustain discrimination and fail to act.
In order to further expand my dissertation project, I plan to further explore how
the EU’s policy interventions affect people with different predispositions about EU
membership. This dissertation focused on an applicant state, where a country is working
to join the EU. In applicant states, citizens consider whether they will join the EU, and
whether EU standards will be able to even further affect the policies within a state.
However, the EU accession process is not the only political process where serious
considerations of EU membership are open to citizens. The United Kingdom is
considering leaving the European Union, and officials from the UK and the EU are
negotiating the terms of staying the EU. Once a deal is reached the deal will be put to a
vote, a referendum. In this referendum, voters will get to decide whether to leave the
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European Union, or accept the terms of the deal. This opportunity provides voters with a
chance to exit European Union membership. Hence, the UK provides a case of
theoretical interest to my research agenda. In the UK, EU officials and UK politicians
appeal to the public about EU membership and issues connected to the EU. For instance,
immigration has become a salient issue with many immigrants coming to Europe from
Syria and the Middle East. Leaving the EU would allow the government to more strictly
monitor and limit immigration into UK. The EU has acted to promote the free movement
of people, multiculturalism, and anti-discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and religion.
The association of the EU with immigration policy may polarize and exacerbate antiimmigrant sentiments within the UK. Politicians like Nigel Farage from UKIP may be
able to use the EU in political messages in order to rile up xenophobia and increase
support for stricter immigration policies, especially in the time period in the run up the
referendum when politicians are actively campaigning for and against the EU.
The survey will include two treatments. One treatment will address immigrants
coming to Europe as affected by the EU (the control group will address immigrants
coming to Europe, without bringing up the EU). Another set of treatment will address
gay rights growing and gay people becoming a more protected group as affected by the
EU (the control group will not bring up the EU). If the findings hold from the Bosnian
case to the UK case, we would observe that those who wanted to leave the EU would
object to immigrants and gay rights even more when they are addressed as an EU issue.
Overall, these future studies and the dissertation itself underscore the need for
politicians and activists to more carefully consider the publics’ perceptions of the EU.
The EU is now a stage of governance with powers and policies that are consequential for
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people’s day to day lives, especially for citizens in the applicant states which may join.
The EU seems to have a polarizing effect (if any effect at all) on public opinion among
the supporters and opponents of membership (and the believers in EU benefits).
However, if there is a key take away, applicant state citizens should not be made to feel
that they need to become more “European” by complying with EU standards. Instead,
EU politicians, national politics, and activists in favor of human rights should try to
persuade citizens that the standards are an important part of the communities within
applicant states.
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APPENDIX A – WORDING FROM THE SURVEY, CHAPTER TWO
•

In your opinion, how likely is it that European Union membership has a positive
economic impact on many Bosnians? (Very likely, Somewhat likely, Somewhat
unlikely, or Very unlikely/ DK)

•

We would like to ask whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly
disagree with the following opinions.

•

Men should receive higher pay than women for the same job.(Strongly agree,
agree, disagree, strongly disagree/ DK)

Four Experimental Groups:
We would now like to provide you with a few brief media statements about a recent
public debate. We will ask you a few questions about your evaluations of the debate’s
effectiveness in addressing various public sentiments after you have finished listening to
the statements.
Group 1: EU Membership Certainty, European Union Emphasis
At a recent public debate, civil society groups discussed gender equality policies
for the state and EU. An EU official told participants that Bosnia will become
a member of the European Union, and meeting the EU’s gender equality
standards will make Bosnia more suitable for membership. In the debate, the
groups proposed that the state train more labor inspectors who can help enforce
equal pay for equal work between women and men.
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Group 2: EU Membership Certainty, No European Union Emphasis
At a recent public debate, civil society groups discussed gender equality policies
for the state and EU. An EU official told participants that Bosnia will become
a member of the European Union. In the debate, the groups proposed that the
state train more labor inspectors who can help enforce equal pay for equal work
between women and men.
Group 3: No EU Membership Certainty, European Union Emphasis
At a recent public debate, civil society groups discussed gender equality policies
for the state and EU. An EU official told participants that Bosnia won’t
become a European Union member until it complies with membership
criteria, and meeting the EU’s gender equality standards will make Bosnia
more suitable for membership. In the debate, the groups proposed that the state
train more labor inspectors who can help enforce equal pay for equal work
between women and men.
Group 4: No EU Membership Certainty, No European Union Emphasis
At a recent public debate, civil society groups discussed gender equality policies
for the state and EU. An EU official told participants that Bosnia won’t
become a European Union member until it complies with membership
criteria. In the debate, the groups proposed that the state train more labor
inspectors who can help enforce equal pay for equal work between women and
men.
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Section 5: Dependent Variable Measures
•

How do you feel about the proposal crafted by civil society groups about equal
pay between women and men? Strongly support the proposal/ Support the
proposal/Neither support or oppose/Oppose the proposal/Strongly oppose the
proposal about equal pay

•

Suppose you were asked to vote for a party approving of the proposal about equal
pay: how much more likely would you be to vote for the party:
Much more likely than I normally would be/Somewhat more likely than I
normally would be/Neither more or less likely than I normally would
be/Somewhat less likely than I normally would be/Much less likely than I
normally would be

•

How willing would you say you are to pay more taxes in order to pay for the
inspectorates discussed in the proposal? Very Willing, Willing to Some Extent,
Neither willing or not willing, Not willing, Very Unwilling
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APPENDIX B – WORDING FROM THE SURVEY, CHAPTER THREE
If a referendum on European Union membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina was held
tomorrow, would you vote for membership, or would you vote for this country to remain
more independent? (EU membership, Remain independent)
Women’s rights
Stage 1, Group 1
Next, we would like to ask you about equal pay between women and men.
Promoting equal pay between women and men is a requirement for joining
the European Union.
On a zero to ten scale where:
•

“0” represents the belief that men’s higher pay than women should become even
higher,

•

“5” represents the belief that pay should stay the way it is now, and

•

“10” represents the belief that women and men should have completely equal pay
throughout society,
Where would you place yourself?

Stage 1, Group 2
Next, we would like to ask you about equal pay between women and men.
On a zero to ten scale where:
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•

“0” represents the belief that men’s higher pay than women should become even
higher,

•

“5” represents the belief that pay should stay the way it is now, and

•

“10” represents the belief that women and men should have completely equal pay
throughout society,
Where would you place yourself?

Stage 2, Group 1
Experts say that the inequality in pay between women and men is
considerably worse in Bosnia in comparison to other European countries.
How responsible are the entity governments for equal pay between women and
men? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where
0 means “no responsibility” and 10 means “full responsibility”
“0” No Responsibility – “10” Full Responsibility
Stage 2, Group 2
How responsible are the entity governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina for equal
pay between women and men? Please indicate your views using any number on a
scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “no responsibility” and 10 means “full
responsibility”
“0” No Responsibility – “10” Full Responsibility
Suppose that you learned that a political party wanted to train and pay enough
labor inspectors to ensure that women and men received equal pay throughout
society. How much more likely or unlikely would you be to vote for that political
party? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10,
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where 0 means “Much less likely”, 5 means “Neither less or more likely”, and 10
means “Much more likely”.
Suppose that you learned that a political party wanted to give control of equal pay
policies to the European Union. How much more likely or unlikely would you be
to vote for that political party? Please indicate your views using any number on a
scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “Much less likely”, 5 means “Neither less or
more likely”, and 10 means “Much more likely”.
Suppose a women’s rights activist asked you to email or call politicians, and ask
the politicians to support equal pay between women and men. How much more
likely or unlikely would you be to contact politicians in order to discuss women’s
rights? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10,
where 0 means “Much less likely”, 5 means “Neither less or more likely”, and 10
means “Much more likely”.
Gay rights
Stage 1, Group 1
Next, we would like to ask you about the treatment of gay people in the
workplace. Promoting the equal treatment of gay people in the workplace is a
requirement for joining the European Union.
On a zero to ten scale where:
•

“0” represents the belief that it should be easier for employers to fire gay people
because of their sexual identity,

•

“5” represents the belief that the treatment of gay people should stay the same,
and
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•

“10” represents the belief that employers should never be allowed to fire gay
people because of their sexual identity,
Where would you place yourself?

Stage 1, Group 2
Next, we would like to ask you about the treatment of gay people in the
workplace.
On a zero to ten scale where:
•

“0” represents the belief that it should be easier for employers to fire gay people
because of their sexual identity,

•

“5” represents the belief that the treatment of gay people should stay the same,
and

•

“10” represents the belief that employers should never be allowed to fire gay
people because of their sexual identity,
Where would you place yourself?

Stage 2, Group 1
Experts say the treatment of gay people is considerably worse in Bosnia in
comparison to other European countries. How responsible are the entity
governments for the treatment of gay people? Please indicate your views using
any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “no responsibility” and 10
means “full responsibility”
“0” No Responsibility – “10” Full Responsibility
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Stage 2, Group 2
How responsible are the entity governments for the treatment of gay people?
Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0
means “no responsibility” and 10 means “full responsibility”
“0” No Responsibility – “10” Full Responsibility
Suppose that you learned that a political party wanted to train and pay enough
labor inspectors to ensure that gay people would never be fired due to their sexual
identity. How much more likely or unlikely would you be to vote for that
political party? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to
10, where 0 means “Much less likely”, 5 means “Neither less or more likely”, and
10 means “Much more likely”.
Suppose that you learned that a political party wanted to give control of gay rights
policies to the European Union. How much more likely or unlikely would you be
to vote for that political party? Please indicate your views using any number on a
scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “Much less likely”, 5 means “Neither less or
more likely”, and 10 means “Much more likely”.
Suppose a gay rights activist asked you to email or call politicians, and ask the
politicians to support equal treatment for gay people in the workplace. How much
more likely or unlikely would you be to contact politicians in order to discuss gay
rights? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10,
where 0 means “Much less likely”, 5 means “Neither less or more likely”, and 10
means “Much more likely”.
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Table C.1: Effects on one’s likelihood to vote for a party that wants to give control of rights to the EU. Tobit Models
Effects on gay rights
Effects on
FBiH
RS
women’s rights
Feeling close to gay people
0.4***
0.2***
0.2***
0.3***
0.2*
-0.01
(0.07)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.06)
Trust in the EU

0.04
(0.05)
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-0.02
0.03
0.1
0.1***
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.04)
Feeling close to gay people*Trust in the
0.008
EU
(0.007)
Ideology (Right-Left)
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.07*
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.06)
(0.08)
(0.04)
Dissatisfaction with the government
-0.04
-0.05
-0.01
-0.05
0.02
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.07)
(0.08)
(0.04)
Political knowledge
-0.12
-0.13
-0.1
0.02
-0.05
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.1)
(0.2)
(0.07)
The treatment of gay people is important
0.3***
0.3***
0.3***
0.3***
0.01
(0.06)
(0.05)
(0.07)
(0.08)
(0.04)
Constant
1.6***
1.5***
1.6***
1.1***
1.2***
5.3***
(0.2)
(0.5)
(0.5)
(0.7)
(0.9)
(0.4)
Survey responses
872
732
729
438
294
742
Pseudo R2
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.004
Dependent variable for the gay rights models: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-EU control party) – 10 (Much more likely to vote for
pro-EU control party). Dependent variable of the women’s rights model: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-EU control party) – 10
(Much more likely to vote for pro-EU control party). Feeling close to gay people: 0 (No feelings of closeness – 10 (Feeling extremely
close). Dissatisfaction with the government: 0 (Very satisfied) – 10 (Very dissatisfied). Ideology: -10 (Very conservative) – 10 (Very
socialist). Trust in the EU: 0 (Don’t trust at all) – 10 (Yes, definitely trust). Political knowledge: 0 political questions correct – 7
political questions correct. Importance of the treatment of gay people: 0 (Not important at all) – 10 (Very important). FBiH and RS
models represents respondents in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, respectively. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Results estimated using Tobit models. Data source: July 2015 survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C.2: Effects on one’s likelihood to vote for a party that wants to address rights effectively. Tobit Models
Effects on gay rights
FBiH
RS
Feeling close to gay people
0.5***
0.3***
0.26***
0.2**
0.4***
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.08)
(0.1)
Dissatisfaction with the government

-0.03
(0.06)

Effects on
women’s rights
0.0002
(0.07)
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-0.17**
0.05
-0.09
0.1***
(0.08)
(0.05)
(0.08)
(0.04)
Feeling close to gay
0.02**
people*Dissatifaction with gov.
(0.007)
Ideology (Right-Left)
0.13**
0.1
0.07
0.19**
0.05
(0.06)
(0.04)
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.04)
Trust in the EU
0.05
0.05
0.02
0.06
0.08*
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.08)
(0.07)
(0.04)
Political knowledge
-0.12
-0.15
-0.16
-0.03
0.0003
(0.09)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.2)
(0.08)
The treatment of gay people is
0.3***
0.3***
0.4***
0.3***
0.03
important
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.8)
(0.08)
(0.04)
Constant
1.0***
0.6***
0.8***
0.4***
0.8***
4.1***
(0.1)
(0.6)
(0.6)
(0.8)
(1)
(0.5)
Survey responses
877
731
728
435
296
744
R2
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.05
0.005
Dependent variable for the gay rights models: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-gay rights party) – 10 (Much more likely to vote for
pro-women’s rights party). Dependent variable of the women’s rights model: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-EU control party) –
10 (Much more likely to vote for pro-EU control party).Feeling close to gay people: 0 (No feelings of closeness – 10 (Feeling
extremely close). Dissatisfaction with the government: 0 (Very satisfied) – 10 (Very dissatisfied). Ideology: -10 (Very conservative) –
10 (Very socialist). Trust in the EU: 0 (Don’t trust at all) – 10 (Yes, definitely trust). Political knowledge: 0 political questions correct
– 7 political questions correct. Importance of the treatment of gay people: 0 (Not important at all) – 10 (Very important). FBiH and RS
models represents respondents in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, respectively. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Results estimated using Tobit models. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C.3: Effects on one’s likelihood to vote for a party that
wants to give control of rights to the EU, with additional controls
Feeling close to gay people
0.2***
(0.06)
Trust in the EU
0.07**
(0.03)
Ideology (Right-Left)
0.03
(0.03)
Dissatisfaction with the government
-0.003
(0.03)
Political knowledge
-0.04
(0.06)
The treatment of gay people is important
0.2***
(0.04)
Feeling close to Bosniacs
-0.06*
(0.03)
Feeling close to Croats
0.03
(0.03)
Feeling close to Serbs
0.06*
(0.03)
Feeling close to Europeans
0.008
(0.04)
Feeling close to citizens of BiH
-0.1**
(0.05)
Constant
2.7***
(0.5)
Survey responses
721
2
R
0.17
Dependent variable for the gay rights models: 0 (Much less likely
to vote for pro-gay rights party) – 10 (Much more likely to vote
for pro-women’s rights party). Feeling close to gay people,
Bosniacs, Croats, Serbs, Europeans, citizens of BiH: 0 (No
feelings of closeness – 10 (Feeling extremely close).
Dissatisfaction with the government: 0 (Very satisfied) – 10
(Very dissatisfied). Ideology: -10 (Very conservative) – 10 (Very
socialist). Trust in the EU: 0 (Don’t trust at all) – 10 (Yes,
definitely trust). Political knowledge: 0 political questions correct
– 7 political questions correct. Importance of the treatment of gay
people: 0 (Not important at all) – 10 (Very important). Results
estimated using an OLS model. Data source: July 2015 survey of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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